Spending to save: Prospective case studies. by Chalmers, Malcolm G.
 
 
 
CICS WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 3: 
 
SPENDING TO SAVE: 
Prospective Case Studies 
 
 
 
Malcolm Chalmers 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF PEACE STUDIES 
 
 
 1
CICS Working Papers 
 
CICS Working Papers are published alongside the Department of Peace Studies’ Peace 
Studies Papers, and are intended to provide reports on research conducted by the Centre for 
International Cooperation and Security (CICS). 
 
About CICS 
 
CICS is a centre for research and training in international and transnational issues, in the 
fields of conflict, co-operation and governance, particularly in relation to violence, security, 
development, democracy, crime and environment. Based within the University of Bradford’s 
Department of Peace Studies, CICS researchers have a range of interests and expertise, 
who, together with an international network of experts and partners, enable CICS to produce 
a wide array of research reports, seminars, policy workshops, conferences and training 
courses with a large and growing number of clients and partners in Europe and 
internationally. 
 
CICS’s Core Activities are organised around: 
 
 Research and Analysis – Working with a wide range of partners, CICS is a centre 
for cutting edge research and policy analysis/support, combining academic and 
practitioner understanding and experience; 
 
 Training – CICS provides tailored training which enables participants and 
organisations to develop their understanding and effectiveness in relation to conflict, 
security, development and governance issues. CICS can develop and deliver in-
house training courses, seminars and distance learning to suit the needs of most 
organisations within its areas of expertise; 
 
 Consultancy – CICS undertakes contract-based work for numerous national, 
regional and international agencies, working on projects covering a wide range of 
issues in its areas of competence. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Centre for International Co-operation and Security 
Department of Peace Studies 
University of Bradford 
Richmond Road 
Bradford  
West Yorkshire 
BD7 1DP 
UK 
 
Director: Dr. Owen Greene 
 
Contact: Andy Brunt, Programme Manager 
Tel: +44 (0)1274 233825 
Fax: +44 (0)1274 235296 
email: cics@bradford.ac.uk    
Web: www.bradford.ac.uk/cics   
 
SPENDING TO SAVE: 
Prospective case studies 
 
Malcolm Chalmers (ed) 
 
 
 
 
March 2005 
 
 3
 
CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgements  
About the Author 
 
 
1.0 SUDAN 2004 – 2018 by Emery Brusset 7 
1.1 Executive Summary 8 
1.2 Introduction 9 
1.3 Peace and Conflict Scenarios 11 
1.4 Additional Annual Costs of the Conflict Scenario 13 
 Table 1 – Key events in the Conflict Scenario and their effects on 
Sudan 
14 
 Table 2 – Costs of conflict to Sudan ($bn. 2004 prices 15 
 Table 3 –  Key events in conflict scenario and effects on neighbouring 
countries 
17 
 Table 4 – Costs of conflict to neighbours ($bn. 2004 prices) 18 
 Table 5 – Key events in conflict scenario and effects on international 
community 
19 
 Table 6 – Costs of conflict to international community ($bn. 2004 
prices) 
21 
1.5 Probability of the Conflict without Conflict Prevention Packages 21 
1.6 Conflict Prevention Packages 22 
 Table 7 Indicative Comprehensive Conflict Prevention Packages 
(costs in $ 2004 prices) 
25/26 
 Table 8 Costs of conflict prevention packages ($m. 2004 prices) 27 
1.7 Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Packages 27 
1.8 Net Present Value and Assessment 28 
   
2.0 AFGHANISTAN 2004 – 2018 By Malcolm Chalmers and Hooman 
Peimani 
29 
2.1 Executive Summary 30 
2.2 Introduction 31 
2.3 Peace and Conflict Scenarios 32 
2.4 Additional Annual Costs of the Conflict Scenario 33 
 Table 1 – Annual loss of national income a  result of conflict  
 (US$bn. 2004 prices) 
35 
 Table 2 – Additional annual cost for Iran and Pakistan as a result of 
conflict ($bn. 2004 prices) 
36 
 Table 3 – Costs to international community in providing emergency 
assistance and military forces ($bn. 2004 prices) 
38 
 Table 4 – Costs to international community in coping with other costs of 
the conflict scenario ($bn. 2004 prices) 
 
40 
 Table 5 – Costs for IC in stopping conflict after it has started 
 ($bn. 2004 prices) 
41 
2.5 Probability of the Conflict without Conflict Prevention Packages 41 
2.6 Conflict Prevention Packages 42 
 Table 6 – Cost of conflict prevention package 1 (US$bn. 2004 prices) 44 
 Table 7 – Cost of conflict prevention package 2 (US$bn. 2004 prices) 45 
2.7 Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Packages 45 
2.8 Net Present Value and Assessment 46 
   
3.0 UZBEKISTAN 2004 – 2018 by David Newton and Greg Austin 47 
3.1 Executive Summary 48 
3.2 Introduction 49 
3.3 Peace and Conflict Scenarios 50 
3.4 Additional Annual Costs of the Conflict Scenario 53 
 Table 1 – Additional Defence and other Spending in Conflict  
 ($m. 2004 prices) 
54 
 Table 2 – Projected Loss in GDP Growth as a result of conflict  
 ($bn. 2004 prices) 
56 
 Table 3 – Human Development Indicators for Uzbekistan 1989, 2001 
and 2013 
57 
 Table 4 – Estimated GDP Loss for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan  
 ($bn 2004 prices 
58 
 Table 5 – Summary of costs of conflict for period 2004 – 2018  
 ($m 2004 prices) 
60 
3.5 Probability of the conflict without Conflict Prevention Packages 61 
3.6 Conflict Prevention Packages 62 
 Table 6 – Costs of Conflict Prevention Package in 2004  
 ($m. 2004 prices) 
63 
 Table 7 – Costs of Conflict Prevention Packages ($m. 2004 prices) 65 
3.7 Probability of conflict with Conflict Prevention Packages 65 
3.8 Net Present Value and Assessment 66 
 Annex 1 – Indicative Conflict Prevention Packages for Interested 
External Actors – Year 1 
68 
 Annex 2 – Modifications to Conflict Prevention Package 1 (year 1) 
in response to key developments during the period 2004 – 2019 
71 
 Annex 3 – Modifications to Conflict Prevention Package 2 (year 1) 
in response to key developments during the period 2004 - 2019 
72 
 
 
 5
Acknowledgements 
 
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Greg Austin, Emery Brusset, David 
Newton and Hooman Peimani in writing the case studies contained in this volume.  We 
gratefully acknowledge the funding from the UK Department for International Development 
that made this research possible. 
 
 
About the Editor 
 
Malcolm Chalmers is Professor of International Politics in the Department of Peace Studies, 
University of Bradford.  His areas of research expertise include UK defence and security 
policy, security sector reform, defence economics and budgeting, and the control of the arms 
trade.  
 6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sudan 2004 - 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emery Brusset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7
1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This case study considers the relative costs of conflict prevention and post-crisis intervention 
for Sudan during the period 2004-2018.  In July 2002 the Machakos Protocol was signed 
between the SPLM and the Government.  The agreed structure of government in the interim 
period is joint, with a dual legal system.  After 2011 a referendum is due to allow the 
population of the south to decide to remain in a united Sudan, or to secede and constitute an 
independent state.  There are still many details to be worked out.  For the purposes of this 
study, however, it is assumed that some form of agreement is reached on the remaining 
points of contention in the negotiations by the end of 2004.  
 
Our baseline assumption is that the international community will maintain its current levels of 
humanitarian and political engagement, suitably adapted to changing circumstances but 
without commitment of additional resources.  In these circumstances, it assesses that the 
probability of a relapse into conflict by 2018 is 80%.  
 
Two packages of additional CP measures are then reviewed, both of which seek to reduce 
the probability of further large-scale conflict taking place.  The first Package consists of 
significant financial assistance in support of new forms of equitable and sustainable 
governance: large scale DDRR, security sector reform, judicial reform and development, a 
supportive environment for investment and creation of a free press.  The focus is on re-
establishing an enabling environment in a country where there has been no civic activity for 
two decades.  The package is based on the programme drawn up by the Joint Assessment 
Mission led by the World Bank.  The second Package includes, in addition, the deployment 
of a robust peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.  While the relatively strict 
control exercised by the GOS and SPLA over their troops allows for a reasonably ordered 
transition, the diversity and size of Sudan pose severe challenges.  Should the leadership 
fragment, the resulting vacuum can only be prevented from fuelling renewed conflict by large 
scale use of impartial force.  
 
In order to ‘break even’ for the international community, the study estimates that Package 1 
would need to reduce the probability of conflict by only 7%, while Package 2 would need to 
reduce it by 29%.  In addition, the benefits of conflict prevention for the people of Sudan 
would be substantial, totalling more than four times the benefits to the international 
community.  If these benefits are also included in the calculation, the success probabilities at 
which CP becomes cost-effective fall to only 1% and 6%. 
 
The governance measures proposed in Package 1 would depend crucially for their 
implementation on the willingness of local political authorities to allow them to go ahead.  In 
terms of the costs to the international community, the biggest uncertainty relates to the 
estimates of the wider costs of conflict, including the costs arising from future oil supply 
disruption, and the possible impact of future conflict on support for, or even bases for, 
international terrorism.  There is also some uncertainty as to the scale and cost of the 
peacekeeping force in CP Package 2.  
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1.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
This case study considers the relative costs of conflict prevention and post-crisis intervention 
for Sudan during the period 2004-2018. 
 
The current civil war in Sudan began in 1983 over issues of semi-autonomous governance 
for the south, and over equal access to resources (in particular water, land, and oil).  The 
fighting has pitched the Government of Sudan, allied to fluctuating groups of ethnic militia, 
against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/SPLM), and occasionally 
splintering factions.  A more recent conflict has begun in the western region of Darfur, but 
with little international involvement and will not be covered by the present study.  The reason 
for exclusion is the disconnection between the SPLA led conflict and the one in Darfur.  
There are few population exchanges between the region and the negotiations with the SPLA 
do not include Darfur.  The war has been carefully insulated from the one with the south by 
the Government.  We therefore assume that the risk posed by the Darfur conflict to the 
GOS/SPLM peace process is consequently very limited.  
 
Identity (religious and ethnic) underlies the fighting, which is loosely organised around a 
Khartoum/periphery dichotomy (the centre being occupied by the Nile valley Arabs).  This divide 
has been exacerbated because it overlaps with the division between a predominantly Moslem 
north and the mostly Christian/Animist south.  
 
The fragmentation of political currents in such a vast country has complicated all efforts to 
seek peace and imposed a process built on alliances and negotiation.  There is a long history 
of negotiation and agreements reached and violated, as well as ever-changing tactical 
alliances.  The level of distrust is extremely high and rooted in historical ties going back 
centuries.  The efforts to negotiate peace have been more or less continual in the nineties.  
Nevertheless, despite these obstacles, in July 2002 the Machakos Protocol was signed 
between the SPLM and the Government.  It defined two interim periods for the move towards 
a political settlement:  a pre-interim period (now expected to finish at the end of 2004) and an 
interim period (2005-2011).  This would be followed by stable peace under a new 
constitutional regime after 2011.  The agreed structure of government in the interim period is 
joint, with a dual legal system: based on popular consensus (and inspired by the East African 
model) for the south and based on Sharia for the north.  After 2011 a referendum is planned 
to allow the population of the south to decide to remain in a united Sudan, or to secede and 
constitute an independent state.  Three states, located around the central latitude (Abyiei, 
Nuba and Southern Blue Nile), are to be given a semi-autonomous status, but would remain 
in Sudan when/if the south secedes. 
 
Subsequent to the agreement on the Machakos Protocol, negotiations have been under way 
in order to define the detail of implementation.  To date, agreement has been reached on 
resource sharing, security structures, judicial systems and the autonomy of the territories.  
There are however still many details to be worked out, such as the identity of the Governors 
and the civil service for the autonomous provinces, the business regulatory environment in 
the south, historical land claims from large landholders and oil concession rights.  All these 
can still serve as pretexts to slow down or even derail the peace talks.  
 
For the purposes of this study, however, it is assumed that some form of agreement is 
reached on the remaining points of contention in the negotiations by the end of 2004.  The 
purpose of the study is to assess the effectiveness of various CP packages that would be 
designed to prevent Sudan relapsing into conflict in later years.  
 
In examining the value of these two packages of additional measures, the study assumes as 
a ‘baseline’ a continuation of existing levels of international community involvement in Sudan, 
particularly on the part of the US.  The first, and largest, of these is humanitarian assistance.  
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This is organised under a UN umbrella called Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS, operating both 
from Khartoum and from Nairobi), but also through church groups (Church Ecumenical 
Action in Sudan, CEAS) and solidarity groups such as Norwegian People’s Aid.  In total, this 
assistance amounts to around $200 million per year.  We will assume that this level of 
assistance will continue, although a large part of this will be transformed gradually from 
humanitarian relief into rehabilitation and other forms of ODA.  If this assumption were to 
prove unfounded, the probability of conflict might also be altered.  
 
The second type of ongoing measure concentrates on creating an effective peace process.  
Since 2001, the US has led an initiative for a reinforced process of negotiations, using as 
Envoy Senator Danforth.  The latter's assessment was that the war was not winnable by 
either side, but that the parties would need to take concrete steps towards agreement in 
order to provide each other with tests of their willingness to seek peace.  These steps would 
have to rely on outside support, to support a peace process facilitated by Kenya under the 
auspices of IGAD, but built around a strong consensus among key donors.  Instead of 
drawing up an optimal agreement between the parties, a series of milestones would prove to 
both sides the intent for progressive compromise which had stymied all previous agreements.  
These milestones, since called the "Danforth tests", have been: a cease-fire in the Nuba, the 
respect of certain days of tranquillity for the delivery of relief (mostly public health campaigns), 
a cessation of acts of violence against non-combatants and some monitoring to reduce the 
practice of slavery.  
 
All these measures have been supported through specific international measures, usually 
based on monitoring seeking to address violations of the ceasefire.  The first, the Nuba 
ceasefire, has been supported by a Joint Monitoring Commission.  An MoU was signed in 
October 2002 to secure a period of military tranquillity.  An addendum was signed in February 
2003 which stipulated that there would be advance notification of troop movements, locations 
and identity of troops would be shared, that land taken since the signature of the MoU would be 
returned.  It stipulated that work on roads would be suspended, propaganda would be frozen, 
and that a Verification Monitoring Team would investigate complaints.  Respect for international 
humanitarian law is enforced by a Civil Protection Monitoring Team.  
 
Our ‘baseline’ assumption is that the international community will maintain its current levels 
of engagement in both humanitarian and political aspects, suitably developed to adapt to 
changing circumstances but without the commitment of additional resources.  It is assumed 
that these will be continued in some form throughout the period to 2014, whether or not 
conflict reoccurs, since in general terms these are forms of response which are not conflict 
sensitive (although there will be different forms of mediation and monitoring, and indeed 
humanitarian assistance, depending on the extent to which there is war or peace in different 
parts of the country).  
 
On this assumption of existing levels of international engagement, the case study outlines a 
‘conflict scenario’ and a ‘peace scenario’ for Sudan for the next 15 years.  These represent 
hypothetical, but realistic, possibilities for the development of conflict, and are based on 
recent trends in the country.  In both cases, they are designed to be broadly representative of 
a much wider range of possibilities.  Two packages of additional conflict prevention 
measures are then proposed for the years following the peace agreement, both of which 
seek to reduce the probability of the conflict scenario taking place.  The financial cost 
implications of both packages are examined, as are the costs of violent conflict breaking out. 
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1.3 PEACE AND CONFLICT SCENARIOS 
 
Conflict Scenario 
 
The probability of a return to large-scale violent conflict during 2004-2005 is very low (outside 
the Darfur region).  The reason can partly be found in the intense pressure and scrutiny 
already being applied by North American and European countries on both parties, as well as 
in the comprehensive nature of the peace agreement already reached, including the 
provisions on wealth sharing and security arrangements during the pre-interim and interim 
periods.  The offensives of late 2002, when both sides attempted to seize maximum 
advantage for the negotiations, have showed both main parties that a military stalemate had 
been reached, and that negotiations (at least in the next couple of years) offer the best 
chances of obtaining further gains.  
 
Oil looms large as one of the factors in the strategic calculations of the two sides.  The oil 
industry has considerably developed since 1999 and is the main reason for high economic 
growth (6 to 8% GDP growth in 2000-2003).  Its potential for further development is stymied 
by the war, however, and some western companies (OMV, Lundin and Talisman) have even 
sold their stakes to avoid the negative publicity tied to operating in a conflict environment.  To 
capitalise on this wealth and respond to the growing demand for oil, therefore, both parties 
now believe they need to encourage stability.  Their joint interest in accessing this wealth 
outweighs the temptation to improve their share in that wealth through the renewed use of 
military power. 
 
It is therefore likely that the peace process will continue for some time, reinforced by high 
profile media coverage, the continuation of the strong diplomatic pressures from the 
international community (and the US in particular) and the potential for elites in both North 
and South to benefit from the exploitation of natural resources.  This is also the point at 
which the conflict scenario becomes entwined in the conflict prevention measures: the 
promise of a considerable peace dividend made up of a large development aid package 
($450 million from the European Development Fund which has lain dormant since 1989, for 
example) acts as a factor of stability in the negotiations.1  In this scenario, we also assume 
that there is a certain element of war weariness in the population and an apparent calculation 
among the leadership groups that war cannot be won.  The elaboration of a new form of 
governance goes hand in hand with demobilisation of armed groups.  Most refugees return to 
their homes, economic activity picks up, and the ability of the administrations in both South 
and North to deliver basic services improves.  
 
Yet the basis for peace, in this scenario, remains a fragile one, with a significant chance that 
divisions within the SPLA and/or the Government (both relatively fragile coalitions) could 
escalate and precipitate a new large-scale conflict sometime during 2006-2012.  Some of the 
smaller war lords, particularly those in the central oil rich regions (mostly Nuer groups) may 
feel that they are losing out to the larger dominant groups and (in this scenario) will begin to 
revert to military means to protect their power.  Similarly there could be growing discontent 
among the smaller Equatorian groups against the continued numerical and political 
dominance of the Dinka in the SPLA, which (in this scenario) has been acquired during the 
interim period without due democratic process.  More generally, the increasing importance of 
oil revenues for both North and South may intensify conflict, as rival warlords and rent-
seekers seek to use armed force to achieve a share of these new resources.  
 
 
                                                 
1  These commitments are included in the ‘baseline package’ outlined above, as part of the maintenance of overall ODA 
levels as humanitarian assistance requirements decline.  
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In the conflict scenario, this combination of factors leads to renewed small scale attacks in 
the south against the emerging public administration.  It is further fuelled by hard-line 
elements in the north who do not want the south to secede and distribute arms to block the 
process.  It echoes the concerns of small tribal groups which have never returned their arms 
and are removed from international attention.  In the oil producing regions this fragmentation 
rapidly escalates into full scale war during the period 2009-2012 and the possibility of holding 
the 2011 referendum in a climate of neutrality and independence is lost.  Intimidation is 
widespread and humanitarian access to certain regions is again curtailed.  The country 
gradually falls back into the situation which prevailed until 2002, when factions would form 
coalitions and alternatively support and betray the SPLA or the Government of Sudan.  The 
estimated two million dead as a result of the war from 1983 to 2003 is more than equalled in 
this new phase.  The intensity of fighting may even increase as a result of the increased 
resources available for the financing of war as a result of growth during the interim period. 
 
Peace Scenario 
 
The peace scenario assumes that large-scale armed conflict is avoided throughout the 
period 2004-2018.  Smaller-scale conflicts are still possible, even likely, but this scenario 
assumes that these do not escalate into widespread violence, nor do they threaten the 
successful holding of the 2011 referendum and the subsequent peaceful secession of the 
South. 
 
The ‘peace scenario’ is intended to be representative of a wider set of scenarios in which 
large-scale armed conflict is avoided.  As such, it is important to outline some of the political 
and economic developments that are likely to accompany, and underpin, the scenario.  In the 
short term, the peace scenario assumes that all the significant armed groups are enrolled in 
the peace process and are fully consulted about the structure of the emerging state (in the 
previous scenario excessive attention was given to certain leading groups, revolving 
essentially around the military hierarchy of the two sides).  This representation provides 
guarantees of protection, access to resources (the oil revenue will be shared equally, as is 
now foreseen in the agreement) and freedom of religion and association.  The international 
organisations are perceived as independent from either of the parties (their bases in Kenya 
and Khartoum are replaced with a more polycentric structure revolving in the south around 
the economic capital of Juba).  The single minded support to peace given by the United 
States coincides with the interests of all the states neighbouring Sudan and more broadly.  It 
is widely perceived that all will gain from a renewed phase of stability and development and 
access to significant new reserves of oil. 
 
As confidence in the durability of peace grows, the peace scenario also includes a large 
scale process of disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and resettlement for the 
estimated 150,000 men currently under arms, leading to a much reduced and relatively well 
integrated national army. The chain of command in the security sector is clear, with a 
southern dominance in the southern regions and a northern dominance in the north, but both 
mindful of the spirit of the agreement. Ethnic representation is balanced. Mechanisms are 
developed to ensure that oil revenues are distributed in a way that is perceived as 
reasonably equitable between key groups.  
 
The peace scenario also assumes that the 2011 referendum is held peacefully and it can be 
expected that the population in the south will vote for independence.  Thanks to careful 
preparation in the peace talks, the resource sharing agreement ensures that nobody feels 
cheated by the separation of the two countries.  The new independent South Sudan is 
recognised by all.  The autonomous states of Southern Blue Nile, Nuba and Abyei are given 
the necessary powers to preserve their unique historical identity, while remaining part of the 
Sudan.  Religious tolerance in an Egyptian style north Sudan ensures that communication 
with South Sudan remains relatively easy even after secession. 
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1.4 ADDITIONAL ANNUAL COSTS OF THE CONFLICT SCENARIO 
 
Additional costs to the directly-affected territory 
 
In the case of a situation of renewed conflict, the cost of conflict can be obtained by 
subtracting what is lost national income or GNI (Gross National Income) from the evolution of 
national income in a peace scenario.  This overall figure can be adjusted to events.  We will 
first review the peace scenario. 
 
In a situation of continuing peace, significant quantities of Foreign Direct Investment are 
likely to be attracted for the development of key sectors of the economy, in particular in 
industrial agriculture (provided that historical claims to property are respected without leading 
to expropriation for subsistence farmers), in mining (especially gold and copper, where there 
are opportunities for investing in new regions) and in oil.  The latter provides currently 5% of 
GDP, but it is estimated that it could rise to 40% of GDP by 2010.  This increased investment 
could be followed by steps towards integration into the world economy.  Roads and rail could 
be rebuilt to the frontier points of northern Uganda and Kenya, to the Ethiopian border and to 
Chad.  The government could use additional revenues for high intensity labour projects that 
would allow for a high rate of employment for former fighters.  In this scenario, economic 
liberalism would be balanced by a reasonably equitable distribution of development support 
between all parts of the country. 
 
Such an optimistic scenario is not implausible when considering recent experience. Sudan’s 
macro-economic situation has improved since the mid-nineties, as a result of fiscal reforms 
and the onset of commercialisation of oil in 1999.  The rate of inflation has decreased and 
internal and external imbalances have narrowed.  The exchange rate has regained a level 
more compatible with the national terms of trade.  From 1996 to 2000 real GDP growth 
averaged 8%, compared with an annual average of about 1.6% from 1986 to 2000.  With 
population growth rates of about 2.6% a year, real per capita income has increased 30% 
during 1996-2000.  
 
The peace scenario would plausibly allow the continuation of these rates of progress.  By 
2006, progress could be made in increasing levels of stable agricultural employment and 
increased provision of education services could begin the long process of ensuring a better 
educated and productive workforce (the average indicators of literacy and primary education 
are below sub-Saharan African rates).  A peaceful Sudan could take much more advantage 
of the small but efficient core of human capital within the country, a dynamic private sector 
and a rich and talented diaspora.  
 
To facilitate understanding of the figures provided under the table on costs to Sudan of the 
conflict scenario, we will first draw up a table containing the key events and new net costs, as 
a result of these events.  
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Table 1: Key events in the conflict scenario and their effects on Sudan 
 
Events Date Effect 
No conflict 2005 
2008 
Nil 
Beginning of 
instability in some 
areas 
2009 Lost income as a result of foregone investment 
(large scale farms not rehabilitated, gold and 
minerals remain in the hands of traditional 
diggers), loss of human capital (public services 
are not deployed, uncertainty leads to loss of 
focus on the future). GDP growth concentrates 
in the north, investment narrows. 
Instability spreads 
throughout the 
south 
2010 Increased humanitarian assistance and 
disruption because of human displacement. 
Lost income as a result of foregone investment, 
loss of newly rehabilitated infrastructure. GDP 
annual growth drops sharply. The re-
mobilisation of troops and the resulting 
economic predation drastically alters the 
composition of public expenditure. 
Access to the 
southern half of 
the country is lost 
2011 Increased humanitarian assistance. Lost 
income as a result of foregone investment, loss 
of newly rehabilitated infrastructure. Oil 
revenue drops from $1600m per year to the 
pre-agreement figure of $600m and remains at 
this level thereafter. 
Return to full scale 
war 
2012 Assistance provided by the population to 
500,000 internally displaced persons, to 
besieged populations and vulnerable groups. 
Continued foregone investment 
War and peace-
enforcement 
operation 
2013-
2018 
Assistance provided to 2,000,000 internally 
displaced persons, besieged populations and 
vulnerable groups; foregone investment, oil 
companies divest from certain areas. 
 
 
The table below integrates these assumptions into projections of Sudan’s GNI for the period 
to 2018.  It is assumed that GNI rises sharply during 2004-2008, as a result of the end of 
major conflict, refugee returns and increased investment.  Thereafter, the peace scenario 
assumes a continuing growth rate of 6% per annum.  In the conflict scenario, by contrast, 
growth falls to 4% during 2007-2009, stagnates in 2010, then falls by 20% as oil revenue is 
cut sharply.  Thereafter, GNI remains constant in real terms, with little opportunity for growth-
producing investment in the oil or other sectors.  In addition, levels of military expenditure are 
much higher in the conflict scenario.  Military expenditure by GOS forces alone was 4.9% of 
national income in 20022 and it is assumed that total military spending (by all armies) still 
amounts to 5% of GNI in 2004.  Thereafter, levels of military spending progressively diverge, 
falling to 2% of GNI in the peace scenario, but progressively rising to 10% of GNI in the 
                                                 
2  IISS, The Military Balance 2003/2004, Oxford University Press, 2003. The military budget of the SPLA and other armed 
groups needs to be added to this to give total military expenditure.  
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conflict scenario. 3   The conflict scenario therefore also involves a diversion of national 
income towards military spending and away from civilian purposes.  
 
Table 2: Costs of conflict to Sudan ($bn. 2004 prices) 
 
Year 
GNI 
(Peace) 
GNI 
(Conflict)
Resulting 
Loss of 
GNI 
Peace 
Milexp 
Conflict 
Milexp 
Extra 
Milexp 
2004 14.4 14.4 - 0.72 0.72 - 
2005 15.8 15.8 - 0.63 0.63 - 
2006 16.9 16.9 - 0.51 0.51 - 
2007 18.0 17.8 0.2 0.36 0.40 0.04 
2008 19.1 18.5 0.6 0.38 0.45 0.07 
2009 20.2 19.1 1.1 0.40 0.55 0.15 
2010 21.4 19.2 2.2 0.43 0.65 0.22 
2011 22.7 17.3 5.4 0.45 1.00 0.55 
2012 24.0 15.6 8.4 0.48 1.20 0.72 
2013 25.5 15.6 9.9 0.51 1.56 1.05 
2014 27.0 15.6 11.4 0.54 1.56 1.02 
2015 28.6 15.6 13.0 0.57 1.56 0.99 
2016 30.4 15.6 14.8 0.61 1.56 0.95 
2017 32.2 15.6 16.6 0.64 1.56 0.92 
2018 34.2 15.6 18.6 0.68 1.56 0.88 
Total   102.2   7.6 
 
Source: 2002 GNI was $11,471m, World Bank Development Report 2004.  This is 
equivalent to $11.9 billion in 2004 prices.  It is assumed this increased by 10% per annum to 
2004. 
 
 
Other human development costs of the conflict to Sudan 
 
In addition to the losses already outlined above, a resumption of the civil war would have vast 
consequences for human development.  Given the experience of protracted war during the last 
two decades, the most important human cost could be the loss of as many as 4 million lives and 
the creation of perhaps 2 million refugees.  These figures represent a slight increase on the 
estimated figures on war casualties (direct and indirect) and displacement during the 1980s and 
1990s.  This increase is based on two facts.  First, if the war were to resume, the oil revenue 
would increase the resources available to finance military expenditure.  Second, it is quite likely 
that a return to war would see increased external support for some of the parties to the conflict 
(with the US, for example, reverting to a pro-SPLA position).  The diversion of resources into 
military expenditure, and the disruption created by conflict, would also have a negative effect on 
provision of social services, including health and education.  This can already be seen from the 
                                                 
3  To the extent to which some of the costs of maintaining armies are met by the international community (e.g. through 
diversion of humanitarian assistance), it could be argued that the costs of increased military expenditure are not wholely 
borne by Sudan. Since this international assistance would otherwise (we assume) be available for civilian purposes, 
however, it is legitimate to include additional military expenditure here even if its financing is made possible, in part, by 
access to ODA flows.  
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current gaps in service delivery between the north and the conflict affected south, with for 
example basic education levels falling from 47% in the North to 35% in the South. 
 
Available data suggest that life expectancy and other key indicators of human development 
did not decline in the 1990s, despite the war.  There has been a significant increase in 
enrolment in primary education since the mid-1990s (albeit with an increasing rate in 
subsequent dropouts).  Yet these overall figures hide important gaps between regions.  
UNICEF’s Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey of 2000 shows average school enrolment in primary 
education to be about 50%, but dropping to 20% in states such as Bahr el Ghazal.  Average 
under-five mortality has declined from 123 per 1000 live births in the early 1990s to 105 by 
2000, and is lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 162.  However in some areas 
they are among the worst worldwide. 
 
While the immediate human development costs in terms of lives lost are clear, therefore, the 
impact on life expectancy and educational progress – two of the three components, along 
with GDP per head, of the UNDP’s Human Development Index – is localised.  The progress 
that has been made in social provision since the mid-1990s is significant – not least a 
significant rise in the HDI - and this appears to be a result, in large measure, of the effort in 
the nineties to rein in unnecessary public spending (flowing from the ‘National Economic 
Salvation Programme’ adopted in 1990) and since then to provide some minimal cover for 
basic services. 
 
It is plausible to think that the higher HDI rates for the non-conflict affected areas, i.e. the 
areas controlled by the Government and outside the reach of fighting, would be reproduced 
everywhere in the country.  This would place Sudan slightly below the average in Sub-
Saharan Africa in terms of per capita GDP, but at the average in terms of per capita GNI and 
slightly above the average in terms of life expectancy and infant mortality (according to 
current World Bank figures, which, based on official figures, do not include the SPLA 
controlled areas). 
 
Additional costs to the neighbouring countries 
 
By comparison with the costs to Sudan itself, we assume the costs to neighbours are 
relatively small.  As Tables 3 and 4 indicate, however, several dimensions are significant, 
first, the reduction in state revenue from trade, when this is disrupted as a result of conflict; 
second, increased security sector spending, where this is necessary in order to cope with the 
overspill of criminality and gun-running as a result of the conflict.  Third, the net costs of 
refugee inflows, once adjusted both for international community contributions and the 
economic benefits that refugees can bring, for example in new skills, increased international 
investment in transport infrastructure.  Arguably, the resumption of conflict in Sudan could 
also increase the possibility and/or the intensity of conflict in neighbouring countries.  Such 
spill-over effects have been apparent in the past in relation to both Eritrea and Uganda and it 
seems entirely possible that they might occur in future.  Yet the relationship is a complex one, 
it is not necessarily the case that the impact of peace in Sudan in this respect would be 
entirely positive and it is difficult to estimate the total cost involved.  We do therefore include 
this factor in the estimates in Table 4.  
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Table 3: Key events in conflict scenario and effects on neighbouring countries 
 
Events Date Effect 
No conflict 2005-2008 Nil 
Beginning of 
instability in some 
areas 
2009 Lost income of $200m per annum as a 
result of reduced trade and taxes, e.g. in 
manufactured goods (beer, household 
items, etc). World Bank figures indicate 
non-oil export figures of $800m per annum, 
of which the majority is cotton, sesame, 
livestock and gold. Most of these items are 
sold in the region, including the Arabian 
Peninsula.  
Instability spreads 
throughout the south 
2010 200,000 refugees into Ethiopia and Kenya. 
Increased loss of trade, but gains in hosting 
international operations in these two 
countries (the refugee relief effort is 
estimated to cost $50m per year in 
contributions, with a large part of regional 
procurement).  
Access to the 
southern half of the 
country is lost 
2011 Loss of trade increases, but is offset by 
increasing positive impact of refugee 
presence on social services, also market 
activity of refugees. Presence of refugees is 
an investment in the border regions, as in 
Tanzania and elsewhere: improvement of 
public services, new skills, more small 
markets. 
Return to full scale 
war 
2012 All communications to southern Sudan lost.  
Some insecurity spreads because of growth 
in small arms markets. This leads to greater 
criminal insecurity and to neighbours 
increasing security expenditure. 
War and peace-
enforcement 
operation 
2013-2018 Assistance provided to 500,000 internally 
displaced persons, besieged populations 
and vulnerable groups, foregone 
investment. 
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Table 4: Costs of conflict to neighbours ($bn. 2004 prices) 
 
Year 
Loss of 
national 
income 
Share of 
costs of 
refugees 
Increased security 
sector spending 
(police and army) 
Total 
2004 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 
2009 0.2 0 0 0.2 
2010 0.2 0 0 0.2 
2011 0.3 0 0 0.3 
2012 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 
2013 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 
2014 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 
2015 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 
2016 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 
2017 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 
2018 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 
Total 3.5 0.7 1.4 5.6 
 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in providing emergency 
assistance and in coping with other costs from the conflict 
 
The initial additional costs to the international community (over and above existing political 
and ODA commitments) are likely to be mainly humanitarian in character and we estimate 
these at $15m in 2009, rising to $100m in 2010 as an estimated 400,000 new refugees flee 
the country.  By 2011, the UN launches a major humanitarian and peace enforcement 
mission, the latter involving a force equivalent in size and capability to recent EU/UN 
deployments in DRC.  But, in this representative scenario, this deployment fails to stabilise 
the situation, the conflict intensifies and the UN is forced to withdraw all but its most basic 
relief operations. 
 
The potential for Sudan to become a significant oil producer means that conflict will impose 
additional costs on the international community, which are likely to grow over time.  If, as we 
assume here, annual oil exports revert to 2000 levels, instead of rising sharply as expected, 
they will be $6 billion lower than they would have been in the peace scenario.  With a 
(modest) assumption of a gross profit margin of 10%, this means that around $800 million 
will be lost to oil companies and their shareholders (currently located in China, India, 
Malaysia, Sweden and France, but would also include the US and UK).  
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There may be additional welfare costs to consumers in the rest of the world (and gains to 
producers and governments in other oil-exporting countries) as a result of increased global 
oil prices, but these are not included here.4  
 
Table 5: Key events in conflict scenario and effects on international community 
 
Events Date Effect 
No conflict 2005 
2008 
Nil 
Beginning of 
instability in some 
areas 
2009 Reinforcement of the monitoring activities, 
some relief aid. 
Instability spreads 
throughout the south 
2010 Assistance to displaced and refugee 
populations (400,000), loss of equipment and 
personnel  in some locations, diplomatic 
activity. This is expenditure additional to the 
baseline funding for rehabilitation and relief 
assistance. 
Access to the 
southern half of the 
country is lost 
2011 Large scale peace-enforcement and 
humanitarian relief operation launched under 
UN mandate 
Return to full scale 
war 
2012 Ongoing operation. Loss of growth in oil 
trading also results in a loss to the 
international community.     
War and peace-
enforcement 
operation 
2013 
2018 
Unsuccessful operation is forced to retreat, 
replaced with palliative humanitarian 
assistance based out of neighbouring 
countries. 
 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in stopping the conflict 
after it has started 
 
If the peace process fails, the first instinct of the international community will probably be to 
reduce its involvement in Sudan.  If conflict is sustained, however, the probability of 
subsequent military intervention by the international community may be greater than in the 
past, mainly because of the growth in its stake in oil production.  Sudan is already, for 
example, a major oil supplier to China and as production increases both specific 
dependencies and (perhaps more importantly) the effect of supply disruption on world oil 
prices will increase further.  Interest in protecting access to Sudanese oil supplies could also 
be seen as part of the developing interest of the rest of the world (already evident in 2004) in 
safeguarding access to African oil supplies more generally.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4  Sudanese oil production in 2002 was 233,000 barrels per day, equivalent to 0.3% of global oil production. BP website, 
2004. Estimates suggest this could rise to 450,000 bpd by 2005. Sudan Country Analysis Brief, EIA, Department of Energy, 
January 2003. While not comparable with major oil producers, a cut-off in this production might have some impact on 
global prices at the margins. If Sudanese production were to cease entirely, for example, US GDP growth could be 
reduced by between 0.025% and 0.05%: equivalent to $2.5bn - $5bn in the first year and a further $5-10bn in the second 
year.  Calculation based on US Energy Information Administration, Rules-of-Thumb for Oil Supply Disruptions, October 
2002.   
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The current international orientation of the Government is expected to last in the conflict 
scenario, which means that it will continue to encourage investment from a variety of 
countries in the oil industry, as well as in mechanised agriculture and mining.  It will court 
western oil companies and will probably be able to stabilise the oil producing area, thanks to 
superior military equipment purchased through the increase in oil revenue.  Even so, it may 
not succeed, in part because, inspired by renewed lobbying by the religious right in 
Washington, the US might be tempted to provide the SPLA with low level military assistance 
and political cover.  A prolonged conflict could throw the country’s ability to maintain oil 
production into increasing question.  More likely, as the conflict scenario above assumes, a 
prolonged conflict is likely to substantially reduce growth in Sudanese oil production and 
development.  In these circumstances, the need to replenish world reserves (because of 
soaring Chinese consumption and the loss of access to some of the Middle East oilfields) – 
bolstered perhaps by humanitarian concerns - could strengthen international support for 
taking military action to stop the war.  An international military operation would then be 
ordered, given a coercive mandate to impose a political settlement and the capacity to 
implement it.  
 
Despite the increasing frequency of military operations, and the likely growth in international 
community concern over oil security (in China as well as OECD countries), large-scale 
intervention is still not likely, even in the event of intractable conflict.  But nor can it be 
excluded, and we believe it is justified to assume a 20% probability of a major military 
intervention in 2013, designed to stabilise the oil areas and/or defeat the factions supporting 
continued attacks in Sudan.  The first-year cost of this intervention is estimated at about half 
the level of the recent Afghanistan intervention, which the Afghanistan retrospective study 
has at $12bn per annum for US troops and $4bn per annum for others in ISAF.  Adjusted for 
the 20% probability, this is a cost of 0.5 x 16 x 0.2 = $1.6 billion in 2013-2016, falling 
thereafter.  
 
Such an intervention would also incur additional non-military costs, as another attempt is 
made to reconstruct Sudan, or its parts, under more direct UN auspices run out of Khartoum.  
Although it can be assumed that this will be funded from domestic resources and loans by 
the multilateral Banks, there will need to be a consistent development effort, which we 
assume will be at about the $200 million which are part of the baseline spending.  It is 
assumed here that the current Iraq examples of a need for a considerable external donor 
effort would not apply here as there is no regime collapse and the core oil producing areas 
are not affected throughout the conflict. 
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Table 6: Costs of conflict to international community ($bn. 2004 prices) 
 
Year 
Refugee 
assistance 
Relief 
operations 
Peace-
enforcement 
Loss of oil 
profits 
Coercive 
intervention 
Total 
2004 0 0  0 0 0 
2005 0 0  0 0 0 
2006 0 0  0 0 0 
2007 0 0  0 0 0 
2008 0 0  0 0 0 
2009 0.1 0.015  0 0 0.1 
2010 0.1 0.1  0 0 0.2 
2011 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.7 
2012 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0 0.9 
2013 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.6 2.6 
2014 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.6 2.6 
2015 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.7 
2016 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.7 
2017 0.1 0.1 0 0.8 1.2 2.2 
2018 0.1 0.1 0 0.8 1.0 2.0 
Total 1.0 1.1 0.9 5.1 8.6 16.7 
 
 
1.5 PROBABILITY OF THE CONFLICT WITHOUT CONFLICT PREVENTION  
 PACKAGES 
 
Even without the two CP Packages, we assume that there is continued attentive and co-
ordinated involvement by international actors in the conflict in Sudan.  Experiences gained in 
the nineties in constitutional transitions (Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, etc) 
and reconciliation can be drawn upon and the continuing provision of humanitarian 
assistance can also help the transition to peace in the short term.  By 2005, when the peace 
agreement is signed, we therefore assume in our ‘baseline’ that teams are deployed to work 
alongside the armed forces of all sides, to channel incentives to the appropriate levels and to 
disseminate information about non-compliance with the agreement.  We also assume a 
willingness to impose sanctions in cases where the carefully designed milestones of the 
agreement are not met. 
 
These measures can help reduce the most obvious triggers of conflict.  However they fail to 
address some of the underlying issues of the conflict: 
 
• The identities of the combatants are now clearly defined along racial and ethnic 
lines (current terms such as ‘Abid’, in Arabic, denote for example both black and 
slave) and religious issues remain a sore point in terms of legislation for those in 
the north.  The loss of life and injustice of war is vivid in public memory.  The 
country is even more fragmented than it was in 1983 at the start of the fighting, 
as a large part of the south is not Arabic speaking and the main vehicular 
languages have been lost (because of the isolation of war).  English has only 
partly replaced Arabic.  Trade and family contacts are now more oriented to 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya than to the north in those regions. 
 
 21
• The governance structure has been determined by the format of the peace 
negotiations: it privileges the elites of the Dinka and the riverain Arabs.  This 
tends to marginalise the Nuer, which live predominantly in the oil producing 
regions and have been the most prone to militia activity since the nineties.  It also 
reduces the ability of the lesser Equatorian tribes to defend their interests and 
express their desire not to be subordinated to the control of the Dinkas in the 
SPLA. 
• There is a small possibility that marginal conflicts will continue to be stoked by 
both sides of the main war to preserve a means of pressure on the other partner 
in the peace process.  This could be the case in Darfur, but could also involve 
Southern Blue Nile (which does not benefit from an international monitoring 
presence, unlike the Nuba) and the oil fields around Bentiu. 
 
Because the peace process has only laid out the framework of a lasting peace, it has not 
resolved older and more structural tensions.  The baseline measures are not sufficient to 
achieve that type of change.  Should there be a wavering of international attention, as is 
frequently the case in international resolution efforts, or should US pressure in Sudan shift 
(for example because a new administration takes over the White House), the fragile 
momentum which prevailed at the talks could disappear rapidly.  
 
A sign of this that is already apparent is the continued mobilisation of the forces of both 
parties, which still includes predatory practices towards the local population (still used to 
attract aid).  There are operational and active weapons and intelligence capabilities in all 
strategic areas of the Sudan, in a state of readiness.  As the new political system begins to 
emerge, the return of disgruntled fighters, as well as the frustration of force commanders, is 
not being addressed.  To do so would undermine the claim of the two negotiating parties to 
represent the whole of Sudan and they have a vested interest in this potentially un-
democratic agreement. 
 
Given these risks, and without additional CP measures, we estimate the probability of the 
conflict scenario is 80% cumulatively for the period 2004-2018.  This is based on the 
judgement that the current peace process, if it is not followed up with new efforts at 
reconciliation, will likely fail to address some of the key forces predisposing Sudan to further 
conflict.  As a consequence, the chances of a relapse into conflict will be substantial.  
 
1.6 CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
The proposed additional conflict prevention packages aim to reduce the potential conflict 
risks as the peace process is implemented, with a view to avoiding the conflict scenario 
described above.  The international community is already committed to ensuring continued 
support to the peace process through impartial international monitoring and facilitation of a 
climate of trust.  This includes the three monitoring missions currently ongoing, the support to 
diplomatic initiatives to ensure that a channel of dialogue is always available and continued 
emergency relief to avoid undue stress being placed on populations wishing to return to their 
areas of origin.  Here we assess two CP packages, over and above the continuation of these 
existing levels of commitment. 
 
Conflict Prevention Package 1:  Governance Assistance 
 
The emphasis given by the international community to the upper levels of the negotiations 
and the reconciliation process mean that there is still little understanding of the fears of the 
smaller leaders and general population.  These are in some cases important components of 
the armed forces and can become disenfranchised, even in a way which is hard for outsiders 
to notice.  The country is difficult to travel in and there is an abundance of remote areas 
where an insurgency can be organised.   
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This package seeks to address these and other concerns by the provision of significant 
external financial assistance in support of the development of new forms of equitable and 
sustainable governance.  This is achieved through support for large scale DDRR, security 
sector reform, judicial reform and development, a supportive environment for investment and 
the creation of a free press.  The focus here is on re-establishing an enabling environment in 
a country where there has been no civic activity for two decades.  The war effort has 
monopolised attention, and both parties have engaged in ruthlessly dictatorial practices.  
This CP package will seek to support the creation of a public space for trust and to enable 
private initiative.  It will be funded from human rights and democracy budgets, post-conflict 
and transition funds (for example a LICUS Strategy for the World Bank) and rehabilitation 
assistance.  It will be multi-sector, with a focus on the strengthening of public services and 
their contacts with citizens.  The package is based on the programme that has been drawn 
up by the Joint Assessment Mission being led by the World Bank and due to be deployed in 
March 2004.  The references to it can be found in World Bank, UNDP and UK preliminary 
strategies 5   A detailed outline of the possible composition of this package, along with 
estimated costs, is given in Table 7.  
 
Conflict Prevention Package 2: Peace Enforcement 
 
This package consists of all the measures under Package 1, but in addition foresees the 
deployment of a robust peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation.  It is foreseen 
that the relatively strict command and control exercised by the two major parties to the 
conflict over their troops allows for a reasonably ordered transition.  However the diversity 
and size of Sudan pose severe challenges.  Should the leadership fragment and ethnic and 
religious factions emerge,  the agreements reached will be violated and the resulting vacuum 
can only be prevented from fuelling renewed conflict by the large scale use of impartial force.  
 
This is a very different operation from the one foreseen to take place in 2012 in the scenario 
of the continuation of conflict:  It is a multilateral operation, based above all on the framework 
of the Machakos Protocol, agreed by both leaderships.  In this scenario the resumption of 
military activity by Sudanese armed groups is rapidly countered by effective deployment in all 
sensitive areas, combining observation and coercion, as well as being able to address 
serious cases of injustice and lawlessness.  This points to the need for a highly mobile 
multinational force containing well armed military personnel, an intelligence capability, 
military observers, a police force and a civilian administrative component well co-ordinated 
with emergency aid agencies.  These can then identify and block attempts at provocation 
and report a need for political solutions to those specific problems from which war lords could 
take advantage. 
 
As the situation begins to deteriorate, CP Package 2 assumes that such a security force is 
rapidly deployed in addition to the measures in Package 1, with a preliminary 5,000 
personnel ‘deterrent’ force assumed from 2006 onwards.  We assume a 50% chance that it 
has to increase to 15,000 in 2008-2014 and a 50% chance it stays at 5000, depending on the 
evolution of the situation. 
 
The costs for the military part of the second package are more hypothetical than for the 
governance measures, but are based on the model of the current peace-keeping operations 
in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and in Liberia (UNMIL).  These forces contain 
10,000 to 15,000 personnel and spend annually about $600 million.  This model is suitable 
because of the comparable socio-political complexity of a breakdown of the peace process 
and the scale of the country.  The obstacles to mobilisation of the necessary forces for such 
                                                 
5  In particular “LICUS Strategy Concept Note: Sudan, dated January 2003, and DFID’s “Sudan Country Engagement Plan”, 
Draft of December 2003. 
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an operation currently seem formidable and the international community seems more likely to 
hope that it can be avoided.  Nevertheless, it is included here in order to illustrate the 
balance of risks and costs that the current omission of such an option involves.  The 
assumption is that, unlike the coercive military deployment which would take place should 
peace break down and in the absence of conflict mitigation packages, this option is exercised 
early.  It can take advantage of the knowledge existing through the relief operations and be 
based around the logistical systems already in existence. 
Table 7: Indicative Comprehensive Conflict Prevention Packages (costs in $ 2004 prices) 
Baseline 2004: continued commitment assumed. 
Programmes conceived as conflict prevention  
 
A. Intense private and public diplomatic dialogue with 
key leaders (two main parties and smaller potential 
splinter groups) to reverse the use of violence to 
achieve outcomes 
B. Monitor the application of negotiated decisions, in 
particular as regards cease-fires, withdrawals and 
demobilisation (support to JMC, VMT and CPMT) 
C. Support the meetings between key leaders, through 
IGAD and the AU, and ensure that all the relevant 
levels of decision making are involved and that they 
understand the agreements reached 
D. Mobilise media and civil society to ensure that the 
population is fully informed of the positions taken, 
and responds with demands that reflect their relative 
position of powerlessness 
Annual total
0.5m
12m
0.5m
2m
     15m
Programmes which have a conflict 
prevention effect as secondary impact  
 
a. The UN, EU, churches and solidarity groups 
continue to offer humanitarian assistance to 
populations in need 
b. Rehabilitation assistance is provided in 
areas where stability is newly gained, in 
particular in food security, primary health 
care, and small scale infrastructure 
c. There begins to be an intense effort in 
capacity building, primarily aimed at this 
stage at local NGOs 
 
Annual total
100m
 
 
     50m 
2m
152m 
CP Package 1 : 2005-2011 –governance assistance. (This is a stand alone package) 
A. DDRR activities for some 170,000 fighters (estimates are for 100,000 on the Government side, and 70,000 on 
the SPLA side).  
B. Reform and training of an independent police force and military cadres, merging of rebel and government 
structures, confidence building measures  
C. Judicial assistance to the new State of Sudan and the special regulatory regimes in the semi-autonomous 
states, in the south, and for the sharing of revenue from oil and natural resources (e.g. of the sort envisaged in 
the EITI)  
D. Development of a body of business law applicable to the special conditions of south Sudan, covering in 
particular large scale communal ownership of land, migration patterns, pre-industrial cultures.  
E. Training and development of an independent press, and a habit of demanding accountability from local 
authorities. Creation of consultative mechanisms as regards public goods 
F. Promotion of a process of people to people reconciliation through the work of religious associations, cultural 
exchange, and conflict resolution meetings at the community level 
 
Annual Total 
 
100m
30m
6m
1m
2m
2m
141m
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CP Package 2: 2009-2014 Peace Support (implemented in addition to CP Package 1)  
A. Obtain a UN mandate and deploy up to 15,000 men in all parts of the Sudan concerned by the SPLA conflict 
 
B. Strengthen African regional organisations to gradually take over from the UN the role of conflict regulation 
 
C. Enlist and maintain through diplomatic activity international support for this force, in particular in the AU, the 
EU, the UN Security Council 
 
Annual Total
600m
3m
1m
604m
Table 8: Costs of conflict prevention packages ($m. 2004 prices) 
 
Year 
 
Baseline 
 
CP Package 
1 
Additional Costs of CP 
Package 2 
Total cost of 
CP Package 2
2004 167 0 0 0 
2005 167 141 0 141 
2006 167 141 300 441 
2007 167 141 300 441 
2008 167 141 300 441 
2009 167 141 604 745 
2010 167 141 604 745 
2011 167 141 604 745 
2012 167 120 604 724 
2013 167 110 604 714 
2014 167 90 604 694 
2015 167 80 300 380 
2016 167 70 200 270 
2017 167 60 100 160 
2018 167 50 0 50 
Total 2505 1567 5124 6691 
 
 
1.7 PROBABILITY OF CONFLICT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
The probability of conflict over the 15 year period is estimated at 15% if CP Package 2 is 
applied.  If Package 1 is applied, that is only the governance measures outlined above, the 
probability of conflict is still quite low, at 30%.  If the security components of CP Package 2 
are applied by themselves, the probability is higher (at 45%) since it loses the synergies (e.g. 
of intelligence) provided by the governance measures and is therefore more likely to be 
misdirected.  We therefore do not consider this option further. 
 
Both of the packages examined are assessed to generate a drastically lower probability than 
would be the case with the baseline level of assistance (also listed in Table 7).  There are 
two reasons for this, both of which are drawn from the empirical observation of previous 
efforts at resolution.  The first is the high level of distrust and the notorious trail of broken 
promises (to plagiarise the title of a book written in 1983 about the political history of the 
Sudan by a southern leader), which require external validation for agreements to have any 
sustainability.  The second is the evidence of the positive impact on the ground of a suddenly 
united international community.  Before 2001, some western countries (in particular the US) 
sided with either the Government of Sudan (before 1989) or the SPLA (after 1990), while 
others (such as the UK) preferred to support state sovereignty.  By addressing both the 
structural and perceptional problems that threaten renewed conflict, the two proposed 
packages have a realistic chance of reducing the probability of conflict substantially.  
 
1.8 NET PRESENT VALUE AND ASSESSMENT 
 
Both the packages discussed here are of relatively modest monetary cost, compared with the 
potential benefits to the international community.  CP Package 1 breaks even if it reduces the 
probability of large-scale conflict by 7% and CP Package 2 has a breakeven probability of 
29%.  In both cases, it is estimated, the reduction in conflict probability exceeds these levels 
by a substantial margin.  
 
In addition, the benefits of conflict prevention for the people of Sudan would be substantial, 
totalling more than four times the benefits to the international community.  If these benefits 
are also included in the calculation, the success probabilities at which CP becomes cost-
effective fall to only 1% and 6%. 
 
Perhaps the biggest source of uncertainty as to the potential effectiveness of the packages is 
that the governance measures proposed in Package 1 would depend crucially for their 
implementation on the willingness of local political authorities to allow them to go ahead.  Yet 
if the international community were united in supporting a package of governance measures, 
it would have considerable leverage to pursue it and its chances of successful 
implementation would be significant.  
 
In terms of the costs to the international community, the biggest uncertainty relates to how 
one estimates the wider ‘non-discretionary’ costs of further conflict.  Sudan’s growing role as 
an oil supplier potentially means that the wider world’s interest in its stability will increase 
significantly, but estimating this in quantitative terms is not straightforward.  Even more 
problematic and controversial is the possibility that renewed conflict might in some future 
circumstances lead to the provision of support for, or even bases for, international terrorism.  
There is no evidence that this is an imminent possibility, but nor can it be excluded as a 
possible consequence of future political radicalisation and conflict.  
 
There must be considerable uncertainty as to the scale and cost of the military force 
necessary for CP Package 2.  In the calculations here, we have assumed a relatively low 
cost force, budgetted at $300-$600 million per annum over nine years for 5,000-15,000 
troops.  These costs are based on the experience of UN forces in DRC and Liberia, which 
are relatively lightly-equipped and with relatively low-cost personnel.  A 10,000-strong ISAF 
force in Afghanistan, by comparison, might cost as much as $1.5bn annually.6  Even allowing 
for the arguably greater logistical and political difficulties involved in the latter, it might 
provide a useful point of comparison for this sensitivity analysis.  For if the per soldier costs 
of the intervention force were to increase to ISAF levels, the total NPV cost of CP Package 2 
would increase to around $10 billion at 2004 prices: requiring a 55% reduction in the 
probability of conflict for it to be cost-effective for the international community.  As with 
current cost estimates, however, this breakeven probability would be sharply reduced if the 
costs of conflict to Sudan are also included.  On this assumption, the breakeven probability 
reduction for a high-cost CP Package 2 is only 11%. 
 
A final risk to highlight is the possibility that baseline humanitarian / development assistance 
will decline during this period, rather than (as is assumed here) remain constant but be 
diverted from relief towards development.  The risk of this occurring may be increased by an 
ongoing Darfur conflict, which could divert donor attention and resources away from those 
areas of Sudan that have been, at least temporarily, stabilised as a result of the peace 
process.  Were such an erosion of baseline support to take place, thus reducing the 
resources available for post-conflict rehabilitation, it might undercut the gains made from the 
CP Packages discussed above.  Perhaps even more seriously, the Darfur conflict (even if in 
many respects separate from the North/South conflict) has the potential to undermine the 
international community’s willingness to support the peace process between the SPLA and 
GOS, as well as its ability to do so.  Despite our initial assumption that these two conflicts are 
largely separate, therefore, there must be some risk that they become linked in a manner 
                                                 
6  See Afghanistan studies.  
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that reduces the probability of success in the conflict which is the primary concern of this 
paper.  
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2.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This case study focuses on the potential for conflict in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2018.  
The Taliban's fall in 2001 ended not only the latter's rule, but terminated the two-decade civil 
war, which ruined Afghanistan.  There has been some progress in reconstruction since then, 
but it still suffers from numerous political, economic, social and security problems.  Renewed 
large-scale conflict remains a real possibility.  
 
This case study begins by examining how such a conflict might emerge and estimates the 
costs of such a conflict to the international community, to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan and 
to Afghanistan itself.  It then examines the cost-effectiveness of undertaking two additional 
CP Packages, both of which are already being discussed widely, but neither of which has yet 
been allocated resources.  The first package consists of the comprehensive assistance 
programme proposed by the Government of Afghanistan, the WB and the UN in March 2004.  
The second package also includes deployment of a further 10,000 ISAF troops in order to 
provide better security in areas outside government control.  The costs of the packages are 
estimated to be $24 billion and $40 billion over the next 15 years respectively, in addition to 
the $71 billion already committed under current plans (mostly for US war-fighting operations). 
 
The two CP Packages are cost-effective to the IC if they produce reductions in the probability 
of civil war of only 7% and 12% respectively.  Unless the IC is confident that current levels of 
commitment to Afghanistan are sufficient to guarantee lasting peace, therefore, the case for 
further investment seems a strong one.  
 
This calculation assumes that (a) a return to full-scale civil war in Afghanistan will increase 
the costs of countering international terrorism, and repairing the damage it causes, by 20%; 
(b) the current costs to the IC of the global narcotics trade will be reduced by 5% if opium 
production in Afghanistan can be sharply reduced, as we assume is the case in the peace 
scenario.  If either of these assumptions is diluted or removed, the cost-effectiveness of the 
Packages will be reduced.  
 
The prevention of conflict in Afghanistan would also have substantial benefits for Afghanistan 
itself and for its neighbours.  If these potential benefits are also included in the calculation, 
the breakeven reduction in probability at which the CP Packages are cost-effective will be 
lower. 
 
 2.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
If Afghanistan is to avoid lapsing into further large-scale conflict, extensive political, economic 
and military/security assistance towards that end is likely to be required.  Apart from the 
requirements of the ongoing war against the remnants of the Taliban/Al-Qa’eda, these will 
need to address the huge level of destruction and underdevelopment of the country, its 
limited domestic resources, its deep social and political divisions along ethnic and religious 
lines and the strength of foreign influence on Afghan political life.  All these factors increase 
the dangers of a future escalation of the current low-intensity conflict into civil war.  
 
The persistence of the above-mentioned problems has continued despite significant 
international engagement in Afghanistan since October 2001.  The Taliban's fall has been 
followed by an expanding low-intensity war (led by 13,500 US troops) against the regrouped 
remnants of the Taliban/Al-Qa’eda.  At the same time, the international community has also 
been engaged in non-military activities.  This has been reflected in diplomatic efforts to 
establish a functional Afghan central government by creating a degree of consensus among 
all the interested influential parties.  Those efforts have included the Berlin conference of 
December 2001, the negotiations between and among the anti-Taliban groups and their main 
supporters (Iran and Russia) and also among Afghanistan's neighbours (Iran, Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).  Together, these led to the convention of the Loya 
Jirga (grand assembly of influential Afghan figures), to the formation of a Constitution 
Committee in 2002 and to the setting up of the constitutional Loya Jirga of December 2003, 
which adopted a constitution on 5 January 2004.  Elections, although likely to be delayed 
somewhat from their original June deadline, are set to take place before the end of 2004. 
 
As part of their contributions to the formation of an Afghan central government, the Western 
countries led the creation of a peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF).  Mandated to ensure peace and security in Kabul, the 5000-strong force has 
been a major factor in enabling the Afghan government to function in the capital.  NATO took 
charge of the force in August 2003.  NATO and allied countries are involved in training and 
arming the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan police force with the assistance of 
other countries.  New Afghan Army bases are due to be built in four major cities outside 
Kabul.  In addition, ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ (consisting of 50-100 foreign military 
and civilian personnel) are being established in Afghan cities to help the government expand 
its authority beyond Kabul.  The first PRT was established in Gardez in December 2002, a 
total of 12 were operational as of March 2004 and up to 18 should be established bythe 
autumn of 2004. 7   Only one of the PRTs (in Kunduz) is currently under NATO ISAF 
command, but it is planned to transfer all of them to NATO in the long run. 
 
Financial assistance from the international community has also increased significantly.  At 
the Tokyo donor conference of January 2002, Western (EU, USA and Japan) and non-
Western (Iran, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan and South Korea) donors committed themselves 
to provide $4.5bn over a five-year period (2002-6) towards Afghanistan's reconstruction.8  A 
fraction of the 2003 approved budget of $87 billion for the operation of the American military 
in Iraq and Afghanistan was dedicated to Afghanistan, of which about $1.6 billion will be 
spent on development projects.9 
                                                 
7  Ron Synovitz, ‘Afghanistan: PRTs go beyond humanitarian issues’, Eurasia Insight, 16 March 2004; Ahto Lobjakas, 
‘Afghanistan: NATO steps up ‘force generation’ for reconstruction teams’, RFE/RL, 11 March 2004.  
8  Council of Foreign Relations, "How Much Will Humanitarian Aid for Afghanistan cost?" Terrorism: Questions and Answers, 
2004. 
9  Anne Carlin, " How to Spend Wisely in Afghanistan," The New York Times, 26 January 2004. 
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 The international community's engagement in Afghanistan has helped bring some positive 
results since the Taliban's fall.  The development of better security conditions in parts of the 
country, together with the availability of a degree of repatriation assistance, have encouraged 
1.9 million Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan, together with 0.7 million from Iran, to return 
to their country so far and a further 500,000 are expected to return in 2004.  Thanks to the 
limited reconstruction efforts that have been possible, basic services such as water and 
electricity are now better provided in some urban areas, while between 4 and 5 million 
children have returned to schools that were previously closed.  A new stable currency has 
been established and cereal production has risen sharply, due to good rainfalls and 
exploitation of previously unused land.  
 
2.3 PEACE AND CONFLICT SCENARIOS 
 
The Peace Scenario  
 
This scenario does not assume a total absence of hostility in the period of the study and  the 
current low-intensity conflict could continue to a limited extent throughout that period.  
However, such conflict does not develop into a civil war engulfing the entire country.  Over 
time, it assumes a process leading to the gradual development of a strong central 
government, supported by an adequate infrastructure and a functional and growing economy.  
This scenario is supported if the US-led coalition and Afghan government (ANA) forces are 
able to inflict heavy casualties on the remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (hereafter the 
rebels) in their rural strongholds in the mainly Pashtun-dominated areas of southern and 
eastern Afghanistan, forcing them to progressively limit their operation and mobility.  The 
process of stabilisation advances fastest in the northern parts of the country, where authority 
gradually shifts from local warlords to the central government’s forces, backed by the 
deployment of PRTs.  
 
In the peace scenario, the improved security environment then assists the government to 
begin implementing some of the long-overdue reconstruction projects that are now feasible 
thanks to the availability of more funds.  During the period 2004-2006, the better economic 
situation created by reconstruction projects begins to reduce the high rate of unemployment.  
Most of the two million refugees currently remaining in Iran and Pakistan return to 
Afghanistan.  The new economic environment creates hope among the Afghans with the 
effect of reducing recruits for the rebels.  Parallel to these, the military operations of the 
coalition-ANA forces further weakens the rebels, forcing them to decrease the number and 
limit the scale of their attacks.  
 
In such a situation, pressure exercised by the Afghan government, backed by its international 
supporters and its neighbours, could convince the warlords of the merits of ending their 
independent rule over most of the country between 2006 and 2010.  In return, they would 
receive senior government positions, compensation for their demobilised troops and for their 
weaponry handed over to the government and an amnesty for their demobilised troops and 
other followers.  The armed terrorist groups would continue with major offensives in the 
southern and eastern parts of the country.  Despite possible short-term success, however, 
they would be unable to change the situation radically.  As a result, the new political and 
economic environment would help the government to embark gradually on turning itself from 
a nominal central authority into a real one, now benefiting from the better security situation 
and economic revival.  The rebel forces would still retain some support in tribal areas, while 
gradually losing their ability to pose a major threat to the Afghan government.  Improved 
border security, supported by Pakistan, would sharply reduce the cross border movement of 
the rebels and deny them a safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas.  
 
The suppression of pro-Taliban Pakistani tribal leaders and a crackdown on the Afghan drug 
industry could, in this scenario, increasingly limit the availability of funds for the rebels.  This 
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 would sharply decrease their ability to recruit and to supply their army, with a result of a 
steady reduction in their military operations and a dwindling of their appeal to the Pashtuns, 
most of whom would see a better life under the Kabul government.  The expansion of the 
pro-government military and police forces to the rural and urban areas would push out the 
rebels from an increasing number of areas, while limiting them to small-scale hit and run 
attacks with an insignificant and declining impact on the overall security environment.  
 
Finally, by 2018 the country would be fully functional, although still far from being a 
prosperous country.  The central government would be in firm control of the country, a result 
of the subjugation of all warlords and the destruction of the rebels as fully functional forces 
capable of posing a serious security threat to that government.  Their tribal-area-based cells 
would only be capable of insignificant operations and banditry, mainly in the border areas 
covered by mountains.  
 
The Conflict Scenario 
 
This scenario assumes that a worsening economic and security situation paves the way for 
an escalation of the current limited conflict to civil war during the period 2004 to 2018.  In this 
scenario, the security situation worsens in 2004-05 as the regrouped rebels increasingly 
resort to large-scale operations.  This is the outcome of two major factors.  On the one hand, 
classical, although massive, military operations of the US-led coalition prove to be ineffective 
in eliminating rebels who have resorted to guerrilla tactics.  Hidden in the Pashtun-dominated 
areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan, they receive a significant degree of support from 
local tribal leaders and from those in the neighbouring Pakistani Pashtun areas.  In addition, 
the continuation of Afghan-based international drug-trafficking provides them, and also many 
warlords, with a significant source of income in hard currency.  This enables them to expand 
and modernise their military forces and to pay for new recruits, most of whom would have no 
hope to find employment elsewhere.   
 
In this scenario, poor security conditions mean that most Afghans continue to be denied 
basic infrastructure and employment opportunities, while the central government is denied 
the ability to provide basic services.  The weak national armed forces suffer from poor 
funding, low morale and desertions and are no match for the well-motivated and better-paid 
and equipped rebels, forcing the government to continue to rely on foreign forces for its own 
security.  This in turn helps the warlords to continue their rule as more legitimate authorities 
than the Kabul regime, as well as enabling the rebels to recruit and enjoy a degree of popular 
support.  As a result, the latter conduct an increasing number of small-scale attacks on the 
coalition forces, pro-government military and unarmed NGO and UN employees operating in 
Afghanistan.  
 
In this scenario, the regrouped rebels then expand the scale and frequency of their 
operations in 2005-07, expanding their controlled territories and consolidating their power, 
especially in small towns in southern and eastern Afghanistan.  Terrorist activities (bombings 
and assassinations) also increase in Kabul and other areas outside the Pashtun region, 
possibly resulting in the death of leading Government figures and coalition personnel.  Major 
cities such as Kandahar and its surrounding towns and villages become the scene of fierce 
fighting, as the rebels seek to re-establish their power in their traditional strongholds.  The 
flow of refugees back to neighbouring countries, and to further afield, increases.  By 2008-
2010, the rebels have a strong presence in southern and eastern Afghanistan, most parts of 
which are practically under their control.  Efforts by coalition forces and the Afghan 
government to recapture those areas result in frequent bloody fighting, but without enabling 
either side to change significantly the status quo.  
 
After several years of such conflict (and with many other pressing demands on its resources), 
the international community progressively scales down its military engagement to decrease 
 33 
 
 its casualties and financial burden, leading to a complete withdrawal of troops by around 
2013.  This in turn encourages more and bolder attacks by the rebels, who now expand their 
operations outside their main areas of support.  Finally, between 2013 and 2018, the two 
Afghan sides are left to continue fighting alone, but with a degree of support for both sides 
from foreign backers (Pakistan's Pashtun tribal leaders in the case of the rebels, the Western 
countries and Iran in the case of the Afghan government).  By 2018, and probably long 
before, most of the country is engulfed in a fully-fledged civil war.  
 
An important effect of this deterioration is that Afghanistan again becomes an important base 
for international Islamic terrorist organisations, who are able to use parts of its territory for the 
purposes of training, recruitment and operational planning.  US efforts to suppress such 
groups during 2001-2004 do not prove fully successful, and in subsequent years, as the tide 
turns against the Government of Afghanistan, the capabilities of these groups is restored to 
the levels of the 1990s.  
 
2.4 ADDITIONAL ANNUAL COSTS OF THE CONFLICT SCENARIO 
 
Additional costs to the directly-affected territory 
 
These are based on estimating the annual loss for Afghanistan of national income as a result 
of the conflict scenario, compared with the peace scenario, during the period 2004-2018.  
The costs of lost human capital and lives, together with other important, but still 
unquantifiable indicators, is excluded..  
 
In the case of the conflict scenario Afghanistan's annual income remains relatively stagnant, 
at the 2003 level of $4.3 billion (of which as much as 50% might be drug-related).  In the 
case of the peace scenario, by contrast, national income for 2004 is assumed to be $4.8 
billion, which then increases at an annual rate of 10 percent in 2005-2012 to reflect an 
emerging confidence in the country's stability and increasing opportunities for productive 
economic activity.  Once the main gains from post-war reconstruction are realised, the 
national income then grows by a steady 5 percent annual increase from 2012 to 2018.  Non-
drug-related GDP grows at a more rapid rate, since it is assumed that the peace scenario will 
involve a substantial reduction in the proportion of GDP accounted for by opium production 
(which is currently around a third of total GDP).  
 
In the absence of reliable statistics on the current government and the armed opposition 
spending and the unavailability of indicators to determine a reasonable difference in 
expenditure during the peace and conflict periods, the assumption would be that the Afghan 
government and its armed opposition combined would spend at least $1 billion annually 
during most of the period of study.  This is based on the available estimated annual military 
expenditure of the Afghan government in 2002 ($525.2 million), seemingly a minimum as it 
reflects the first year spending of the post-Taliban government with a heavy reliance on the 
US-led coalition force for its security.10  Once stabilisation has been achieved in the peace 
scenario, however, some reduction in military spending is assumed. 
                                                 
10  "Afghanistan: Military," AllRefer.com, 2004, accessed: 25 January 2004. 
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 Table 1: Annual loss of national income as result of conflict ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year Income in 
Peace 
Scenario 
Income in 
Conflict 
Scenario 
Income loss in 
Conflict 
Scenario 
Savings in 
ME  
2004 4.8 4.3 0.5  
2005 5.3 4.3 1.0  
2006 5.8 4.3 1.5  
2007 6.4 4.3 2.1  
2008 7.0 4.3 2.7  
2009 7.7 4.4 3.3  
2010 8.5 4.5 4.0  
2011 9.4 4.6 4.8  
2012 10.3 4.7 5.6  
2013 10.8 4.8 6.0 0.1 
2014 11.3 4.9 6.4 0.1 
2015 11.9 5.0 6.9 0.2 
2016 12.5 5.0 7.5 0.2 
2017 13.1 5.0 8.1 0.2 
2018 13.8 5.0 8.8 0.3 
Total 138.6 69.4 69.2 1.1 
 
 
Additional costs to the neighbouring countries 
 
In estimating the additional cost to Iran and Pakistan in the case of conflict in Afghanistan, 
we do not assume any losses of aggregate national income for those countries.  We 
therefore base our estimations on (a) losses in the forms of costs pertaining to the Afghan 
refugees residing in both those countries; (b) costs of dealing with the Afghan-based 
international drug-trafficking (especially in Iran).  Despite a significant degree of repatriation 
since early 2002, some three million Afghan refugees still live in Iran (1.5 million) and 
Pakistan (1.5 million), and a degree of return flow of several hundred thousand Afghans into 
these countries has continued in parallel with repatriation.11  In the conflict scenario, we 
assume that net repatriation would slow and then reverse.  
 
As in the Afghanistan retrospective study, we assume a per capita cost for each refugee in 
Iran of around $1,000 per head. 12   Half of these costs, it is estimated, are borne by 
neighbouring countries and half by the international community.  This total includes the cost 
of providing education and medical services, treating infectious diseases and treating war-
related wounded refugees.  It is assumed that refugee numbers rise steadily to 5 million by 
2012 in the conflict scenario, but fall to zero during the same period in the peace scenario. 
The additional cost of the conflict scenario therefore rises steadily.  
                                                 
11  " Illegal Migration of Afghans to Iran Has Resumed," Ettela'at Binolmelali (Tehran), 8 August 2002. 
12  Annex B. 
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 Table 2:  Additional annual cost for Iran and Pakistan as result of conflict  
 ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year Cost of refugees: 
conflict scenario 
Cost of 
refugees: peace 
scenario 
Additional 
Cost of 
refugees 
Extra border 
security Iran in 
conflict 
scenario 
2004 1.7 1.5 0.2 0 
2005 2.0 1.3 0.7 0 
2006 2.0 1.0 1.0 0 
2007 2.1 0.8 1.3 0 
2008 2.2 0.6 1.6 0.1 
2009 2.3 0.4 1.9 0.1 
2010 2.4 0.2 2.2 0.2 
2011 2.5 0 2.5 0.2 
2012 2.5 0 2.5 0.2 
2013 2.5 0 2.5 0.2 
2014 2.5 0 2.5 0.3 
2015 2.5 0 2.5 0.3 
2016 2.5 0 2.5 0.3 
2017 2.5 0 2.5 0.4 
2018 2.5 0 2.5 0.4 
Total 34.7 5.8 28.9 2.7 
 
 
Finally, we take into account the $800 million now being spent by Iran (and to a more limited 
extent Pakistan) in fighting Afghan-based drug-traffickers along their long borders.  Owing 
their operation with impunity to Afghanistan's conflict-generated lawlessness, their operation 
and Iran's counter-operation would likely continue at this level in the conflict scenario during 
2004-2018.  By contrast, some part of this spending can be saved in later years of the peace 
scenario.  Arguably, additional costs might also fall on Pakistan in the form of the expenditure 
needed to tackle cross-border infiltration of militants.  Given the uncertainties over whether a 
future Pakistan government might view a Pashtun rebellion in Afghanistan as positive or 
negative, however, we have not added an estimate for this in this exercise. 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in providing emergency 
assistance, and in coping with other costs from the conflict 
 
Because this case study concerns CP in an environment where conflict is already taking 
place and in which the IC is already involved, the purpose of this section is to assess the cost 
implications of both the conflict scenario and the peace scenario, on the assumption of a 
continuation of current ‘baseline’ levels of international ODA and military commitments, i.e. 
before adding the costs of the two CP packages outlined below.  Discussion of additional 
commitments, over and above those pledged at the 2002 Tokyo conference, is due to take 
place in Berlin in late March 2004.  Proposals have also been made for an extension of ISAF 
to an Afghanistan-wide role.  For the purposes of this study, however, these additional 
commitments will be part of the CP packages, not the baseline.  
 
Our estimates of baseline financial assistance start with the disbursed level of foreign 
assistance for January 2002 – March 2003 ($1.8 billion), which is then used (adjusted to an 
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 annual basis) as a guideline for estimating annual foreign contributions over the first years of 
the period 2004-2018.13  The estimated annual amount of $1.4 billion for 2004 includes 
transfers to the Afghan government ($900 million), contributions to NGO operations ($100 
million), contributions to UNHCR budget ($160 million), contribution to development projects 
such as disarming ex-Mujahedin and anti-narcotics projects and emergency projects of about 
$200 million.14 
 
In the baseline peace scenario, we assume that assistance remains steady at this level for 3 
years, but is progressively shifted from humanitarian and refugee-related expenditure into 
development programmes and support for the Government recurrent budget.  From 2007, we 
then assume a progressive reduction in annual financial assistance to a level of $1 billion per 
annum by 2010, as Afghanistan is increasingly seen as a ‘normal’ aid recipient, competing 
with other demands on limited global ODA budgets.  Expenditure on international military 
forces (US and NATO/ISAF) in Afghanistan remains at 2003 levels in 2004, but then falls 
sharply as the resources needed for (expensive) war-fighting missions decline, 
responsibilities are increasingly handed over to Afghan forces and rebels become 
increasingly isolated geographically.  By 2008, annual costs decline to $3 billion, comparable 
to current ISAF costs, plus some significant residual US component.  Costs then dwindle, 
with all international military forces having departed by 2012.  
 
In the baseline conflict scenario, by contrast, the total level of ODA is comparable with that of 
the peace scenario, but with an increasing proportion spent on humanitarian rather than 
development operations.  As the Kabul government weakens and international military 
support for it is reduced, however, ODA is reduced and by 2015 returns to the levels of 
assistance characteristic of the 1990s, focused primarily on humanitarian relief.  Military 
spending by the IC in Afghanistan declines on a slower trajectory than the peace scenario as 
its forces seek to shore up the ailing government.  In this baseline scenario, it is assumed 
that no increase over 2003 troop levels is ordered because of resource constraints, 
competing demands and increasing political concern at the costs of overseas entanglements.  
As the attempt to achieve stabilisation at (relatively) low cost progressively fails, IC military 
spending in Afghanistan begins to decline sharply from 2008 onwards, falling to zero from 
2013.  
 
Table 3 shows that the conflict scenario is significantly more expensive than the peace 
scenario for the IC, largely because of the longer period of high military spending that is 
involved in deciding to run down its military commitment in the event of failure to stabilise 
Afghanistan, compared with the more rapid run-down in the event of success.  
                                                 
13  Transitional Government of Afghanistan, Analysis of Aid Flows to Afghanistan, April 2003. 
14  Ibid; and UNHCR, Sectoral and Geographical Breakdown of Total Budget, “Afghanistan Appeal 2003, UNHCR. p. 12, 
accessed: 23 January 2004. 
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 Table 3: Costs to international community in providing emergency assistance and 
military forces ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year ODA: 
peace 
baseline 
Military: 
peace 
baseline 
ODA: 
conflict 
scenari
o 
Military: 
conflict 
scenario 
Additional 
cost: conflict 
scenario 
2004 1.4 13 1.4 13 0 
2005 1.4 13 1.4 13 0 
2006 1.4 13 1.4 13 0 
2007 1.3 8 1.3 13 5 
2008 1.2 3 1.2 13 10 
2009 1.1 2 1.1 10 8 
2010 1.0 1 1.0 8 7 
2011 1.0 1 0.8 5 3.8 
2012 1.0 0 0.7 3 2.7 
2013 1.0 0 0.6 0 -0.4 
2014 1.0 0 0.4 0 -0.6 
2015 1.0 0 0.3 0 -0.7 
2016 1.0 0 0.3 0 -0.7 
2017 1.0 0 0.3 0 -0.7 
2018 1.0 0 0.3 0 -0.7 
Total 16.8 54 12.5 91 32.7 
 
 
In addition, as in the retrospective Afghanistan study, some allowance should be made for 
the increased risks to the IC in the conflict scenario that might be created from increased 
international terrorism and the continuing export of narcotics from Afghanistan.  While 
estimates of these ‘non-discretionary’ costs of conflict to the IC are problematic in many 
respects, it would be even more questionable to assume that no increase in such risks would 
take place were current stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan to fail (as the conflict scenario 
assumes). 
 
With regard to international terrorism, our conflict scenario would allow large parts of 
southern and eastern Afghanistan (and perhaps parts of Pakistan) to be used as a training 
and operational base.  It would provide a major boost in morale for Al-Qaeda and similar 
networks of radical Islamist terrorists, encourage recruitment of new personnel from across a 
wide range of countries and undermine the morale of moderate forces in Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq and elsewhere.  As in the 1990s, such groups would be likely to work in alliance 
with Taliban and similar Afghan forces, providing them with military support in return for safe 
haven.  In the absence of such an operating base, continuing international terrorism would 
still take place, but it would be reasonable to assume that it would be significantly more 
difficult to organise and carry out.  We therefore assume that the conflict scenario would be 
associated with an increase in the frequency of international terrorism, compared with what 
would take place in the peace scenario.  This would potentially affect all parts of the world, 
both developed and developing.  
 
For the purposes of our calculations here, we assume that the current global cost of 
countering international terrorism (including inefficiencies in trade, security costs) is 0.3% of 
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 global GDP, equivalent to $90 billion per year.15  We also assume (conservatively) that the 
direct cost of international terrorism is a further $20 billion per year, on the assumption that 
damage cumulatively equivalent to half that incurred by the 9/11 attack is inflicted every year.  
In the event of the peace scenario in Afghanistan, we assume these costs remain at these 
levels.  Were the conflict scenario to take place, we assume that these costs would increase 
by 20% from 2008 onwards: an additional cost of $22 billion per year.  The sensitivity 
analysis at the end of this paper will explore the implications of varying this assumption.  
 
Afghanistan is the source of around 70% of the world’s opium production, accounting for as 
much as half total Afghan GDP and this is assumed to continue to be the case in the conflict 
scenario.  In the peace scenario, however, it is assumed that this level of production will 
decrease significantly as Government control of its territory expands and alternative 
economic opportunities are created.  Were this reduction in supply to result in a significant 
reduction in availability in global markets, the benefits would be very considerable indeed.  In 
neighbouring Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia, as well as further afield in Afghanistan, Europe 
and the US, increased illegal consumption of heroin and other narcotics has played a key 
role in both large-scale organised crime and small-scale criminality.  In the UK (90% of 
whose heroin originates in opium from Afghanistan), drug use is a key factor in the rapid 
growth in prison population over the last decade.  Reducing global access to heroin might, 
therefore, have significant social and economic benefits.  The causal relationships are too 
complex and under-explored to discuss in this paper.  For the purposes of our calculation, 
however, we assume that the total global costs of narcotic misuse are at least $200 billion 
and that these costs could be reduced by 5% if supply from Afghanistan were to be reduced 
to a fraction of its current level without transfer of production elsewhere.16  These savings, it 
is assumed, would be progressively realised from 2008 onwards in the peace scenario for 
Afghanistan.  
                                                 
15  The IMF estimated that the loss of US output resulting from terrorism related costs could be as high as 0.75% of US GDP. 
A 2002 CBO study estimated terrorism directly cost the US about 0.3% of non-farm GDP, and reduced total factor 
productivity by around 0.3%. Robert Keleher, ‘The Economic Costs of Terrorism’, Joint Economic Committee, US 
Congress, May 2002, and Geoff Raby, DFAT Australia, ‘The Costs of Terrorism and the benefits of cooperating to combat 
terrorism’, 24 February 2003 provide useful surveys of these and other estimates.  
16  This broadbrush estimate of cost includes drug control budgets ($33  billion in the US alone), cocaine and heroin consumer 
spending ($80  billion in the US and Europe), as well as costs of prisons, crime, personal security. 
 39 
 
 Table 4: Costs to international community in coping with other costs of the conflict 
scenario ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year Increased international 
terrorism 
Increased narcotics 
availability 
Total 
2004 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 
2008 22 2 24 
2009 22 4 26 
2010 22 6 28 
2011 22 8 30 
2012 22 10 32 
2013 22 10 32 
2014 22 10 32 
2015 22 10 32 
2016 22 10 32 
2017 22 10 32 
2018 22 10 32 
Total 242 90 332 
 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in stopping the conflict 
after it has started 
 
In the conflict scenario outlined here, the international community withdraws in the aftermath 
of its failure to stabilise Afghanistan with existing levels of forces.  In the event of a further 
large-scale incident of international terrorism in the US being directly associated with Afghan-
based forces, it is likely that a future military intervention will take place.  Such an incident 
could take place at any time.  For the purposes of this calculation, however, we assume that 
it takes place mid-way through the period in mid-2011.  The previous failure of the period 
2002-2010 would rule out an identical response to that of this period.  More likely, having 
learnt the same lesson twice, the IC would now commit itself to a much larger package of 
full-scale military intervention and ODA.  First, we assume this would involve costs 
comparable to those in 2002 and 2003, increasing as a new ISAF expands rapidly 
throughout the country, then tailing off from 2017 onwards.17  Second, we assume a rapid 
build-up of ODA levels to the $4bn per annum currently being sought by the Government and 
international development agencies as the level necessary (in 2004-2011) to stabilise the 
country.  
 
Yet such a robust response, essentially revisiting and reversing the errors of the past, would 
only take place if there were to be an event resembling (or exceeding) the attacks of 9/11, 
linked to the use of Afghanistan as a base, and probably taking place on US soil.  A more 
indirect relationship of Afghan basing to increased international terrorism was insufficient to 
induce invasion during the 1990s and we assume it would be insufficient in our conflict 
scenario.  On the assumption that such an attack is 20% more likely to take place during the 
                                                 
17  Further details are given in the Afghanistan retrospective study. 
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 period in the conflict scenario, compared with the peace scenario, we then have to discount 
the costs of a second invasion by 80%.  
Table 5: Costs for IC in stopping conflict after it has started ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year Added military 
cost  
Added ODA cost  Total (discounted 
by 80%) 
2004    
2005    
2006    
2007    
2008    
2009    
2010    
2011 6 1 1.4 
2012 12 3 3.0 
2013 13 4 3.4 
2014 14 4 3.4 
2015 14 4 3.4 
2016 14 4 3.4 
2017 10 4 3.4 
2018 8 4 3.4 
Total 91 28 24.8 
 
 
2.5 PROBABILITY OF THE CONFLICT WITHOUT CONFLICT PREVENTION 
 PACKAGES 
 
Without the significant increases in military engagement and financial assistance that are 
included in the two CP Packages, there is a risk that current efforts at stabilisation will fail 
and Afghanistan will progressively (as discussed in the conflict scenario) slide back into civil 
war.  In this scenario, it is assumed, the international community is reluctant to commit 
additional military resources for fear of being bogged down in a long war of attrition, with its 
expected high costs in human lives and financial means.  It is also unwilling to commit 
additional amounts of economic aid, over and above current levels of assistance.  
 
Politically, the Afghan Government remains vulnerable as long as its writ remains extremely 
limited outside Kabul and surrounding areas, its leaders are vulnerable to assassination or 
overthrow, and its ability to respond to economic, social and security problems is limited by 
inadequate amounts of foreign assistance.  Current levels of per capita international 
assistance - $63 per head in 2002 - compare poorly with levels in Bosnia, Kosovo and East 
Timor in the past.  Because of Afghanistan’s greater population (25 million compared with 
Bosnia’s 4 million), the total costs of a given level of per capita ODA are much higher and 
this helps explain the difficulties that have been encountered in mobilising ODA resources.  If 
not rectified, however, the consequence may be a growing gap between expectations of 
economic and social improvement and reality on the ground.  Not least, there has been 
relatively little progress in tackling the growth in opium production, which now accounts for as 
much as half of total Afghan GDP, and has the potential to deeply destabilise Afghan society 
and politics, turning it into a ‘narco-state’.  The security situation is also fragile.  Government 
military and police forces remain weak, and several years away from meeting the rebels' 
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 challenge on its own.  Yet so far it has not been possible to reach agreement on a substantial 
expansion of ISAF forces beyond Kabul.  In late 2003, it took several months for NATO to 
obtain two desperately needed helicopters for ISAF, at a time when many more were 
deployed in Iraq.  More recently, the extension of PRTs is a step in the right direction, but 
needs to be put into perspective.  The UK-led PRT in northern Afghanistan, for example, has 
50-70 soldiers in an area of operation the size of Scotland.  If this level of security 
commitment cannot be improved, the risks of a further deterioration are significant. 
 
Substantial progress has been made since 2001 and it would be wrong to dismiss the 
achievements made possible by current levels of military and financial assistance.  It is 
possible that this progress could continue, with repeated US-led offensives wearing down 
rebel resistance, continuing economic assistance persuading key faction leaders to 
recognise the authority of the Kabul government, and the narco-economy increasingly being 
marginalised.  But the risks of failure are substantial and have been increased by the 
relatively low level of IC resource commitment, measured not in absolute terms but in terms 
of the scale of the challenges faced by Afghanistan.  Because of limited resources, progress 
is slower than it could have been, setbacks are more common, and the chances of a major 
crisis (e.g. in the aftermath of a Karzai assassination or a change of government in Pakistan) 
higher than they might have been.  The risks may be particularly severe during the next 2-3 
years.  
 
On the assumption of no increase in available IC resources to Afghanistan, we therefore 
assess the probability of the conflict scenario (i.e. escalation to full-scale civil war) at 80% 
during 2004-2018.  It is possible that Afghanistan will pull through without further assistance, 
but the risks are considerable.  As a recent joint bid for additional ODA resources from the 
Government of Afghanistan and international organisations argued: 
 
‘staying too close to a minimal effort for too long will adversely affect expectations and 
commitments of the different segments of Afghan society.  In this scenario, the 
investment in building security and economic management institutions will not 
translate into outcomes quickly enough to convince people to invest in the country’s 
human and physical capital…..’  This will undercut the broad consensus that currently 
exists in the community for reforms in the economic and security domains.  There are 
currently strong and concentrated interests in Afghanistan who are angling for a weak 
central government which will allow them to undertake narcotic production and illegal 
natural resource exploitation.  Without visible and rapid progress, the consensus for 
reform will not be sustained (and) even modest levels of economic growth in legal 
activities will not occur.’18 
 
2.6 CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
Conflict Prevention Package 1   
 
This package is based around an increase in international financial assistance, in line with 
the plans elaborated by the Afghan Government, in co-operation with the WB, ADB, UNDP 
and UN Assistance Mission.19  These plans, which are due to be discussed at a donor 
conference in late-March 2004, provide for an increase in international assistance to around 
$4 billion per annum over a seven year period.  As this proposal argues: 
                                                 
18  World Bank et al, Securing Afghanistan’s Future, March 2004.  
19  Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, ADB / World Bank / UNDP / UNAMA, 17 
March, 2004. 
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 ‘This international assistance to Afghanistan should be looked on as an investment in 
stability, peace-building and development at local, regional and global levels.  It is 
not charity.  It will enhance regional stability, reduce the global threats of drugs and 
terrorism, and lower the associated defence and security-related costs of many 
nations. It should also be seen in the context of continuing international security 
costs in Afghanistan, including over US $13 billion per year of spending on Coalition 
and ISAF forces, as well as the more than US $2 billion spent over the past two 
years in responding to humanitarian emergencies that a failed state would have no 
capacity to address. Success in Afghanistan will permit drastic reductions over time 
in these expenditures.’20 
 
These plans result from more than two years of reconstruction experience and correspond to 
estimates made in July 2003 by Care International, which estimated required funds to be 
between $15 and US$30 billion over a five-year period ($3-6 billion per year).  It corresponds 
to around $160 per capita, still less than in the initial years of reconstruction in Bosnia ($326 
in 1996-99) and East Timor ($195 in 1999-2001), but comparable to Bosnia or Macedonia in 
2001 ($157 and $122 respectively), and amongst the highest levels of per capita ODA in the 
world.  Moreover, because of the greater size of Afghanistan’s population compared to these 
other post-conflict territories, this proposed aid package would make Afghanistan the largest 
ODA recipient in the world by a significant margin, with the possible (but probably short-lived) 
exception of Iraq.21  
 
The proposed package is especially ambitious because, in contrast to many other post-
conflict stabilisation programmes, it is assumed that the level of external assistance is 
maintained for seven years, rather than falling sharply after the first three years.  Given the 
extent of Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development needs, as well as the slow pace at 
which domestic revenue can be expected to recover, this is a reasonable assumption.  
However it is an ambitious target, given the limited global availability of ODA and the many 
competing demands that are likely during this period.  
 
After year 7, we assume that ODA to Afghanistan will be reduced incrementally to a level of 
$1 billion, more comparable to other major aid recipients, though still relatively high on a per 
capita basis. Since Afghanistan will remain one of the poorest countries of the world, and 
because of its new strategic and symbolic significance, it is assumed that this level will 
remain for the rest of the period.  
                                                 
20  Ibid. 
21  Because of its greater access to domestic revenues, Iraq might be expected to reduce dependence on concessional 
assistance much more rapidly than Afghanistan. Proposed ODA flows to Afghanistan exceed those to today’s largest ODA 
recipients, all of which have much larger populations. In 2001, these were Pakistan ($1938m),  India ($1705m), Indonesia 
($1501m), China ($1460m) and Vietnam ($1435m). World Bank, World Development Report 2004, Table 5.   
 43 
 
 Table 6: Cost of conflict prevention package 1 ($bn, 2004 prices) 
 
Year Current plans 
for ODA  
‘Securing Afghanistan’s 
Future’  programme  
Additional 
ODA  
2004 1.4 4 2.6 
2005 1.4 4 2.6 
2006 1.4 4 2.6 
2007 1.3 4 2.7 
2008 1.2 4 2.8 
2009 1.1 4 2.9 
2010 1 4 3 
2011 1 3 2 
2012 1 2.5 1.5 
2013 1 2 1 
2014 1 1.5 0.5 
2015 1 1 0 
2016 1 1 0 
2017 1 1 0 
2018 1 1 0 
Total 16.8 41 24.2 
 
 
Conflict Prevention Package 2  
 
Although CP Package 1 includes financial support to the Afghan security sector, as well as to 
DDR, it does not include any additional provision for external military assistance.  CP 
Package 2 remedies this, by adding a significant enhancement in the size of ISAF, allowing it 
to progressively deploy substantial forces in all provinces until Government forces are 
sufficiently capable of taking their place.  Recent estimates suggest that ‘international forces 
in Afghanistan are almost certainly short by at least 10,000 troops to meet the needs of 
creating lasting peace and stability.’22  
 
These additional forces are required essentially to meet the short term security gap that 
exists while rebel and warlord threats to Kabul’s authority remain strong, yet the 
Government’s own security forces remain weak.  Yet security concerns are likely to remain 
for much longer than in many other post-conflict environments, given both the traditions of 
local war-lordism and the destructive influence of the drugs economy.  While the ‘baseline’ 
for external military involvement assumes a rapid rundown after 2007 and complete 
withdrawal by 2012, therefore, this package assumes a continued commitment of ISAF 
troops throughout the period, although the level falls to 5000 during 2010-12.  This additional 
force is estimated to cost $1.5 billion for 10,000 additional troops, based on an average 
annual cost per soldier of $150,000.23 
 
                                                 
22  Michael O’Hanlon and P W Singer, ‘The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity’, Survival, 
46, 1, Spring 2004, p. 80. This is similar to estimates made by SRSG Brahimi in 2003.  
23  The per soldier annual costs for US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively are $270,000 and $240,000. Bradley 
Graham, ‘Disparity in Iraq, Afghanistan War Costs Scrutinised’, Washington Post, 11 November 2003. This compares with 
annual costs of around $125,000 per soldier for UK forces in Iraq during 2003/04. Calculated from UK MoD, Operations in 
Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December 2003, Chapter 12. Given the leaner cost profile of European forces, more 
comparable to the UK than the US, we assume a $150,000 annual per soldier cost.  
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 Table 7: Cost of conflict prevention package 2 ($bn, 2004 prices) 
 
Year Additional 
ODA  
Military: 
baseline 
costs 
Additional 
ISAF costs  
Total costs CP 
Package 2 
2004 2.6 13 1.5 4.1 
2005 2.6 13 1.5 4.1 
2006 2.6 13 1.5 4.1 
2007 2.7 8 1.5 4.2 
2008 2.8 3 1.5 4.3 
2009 2.9 2 1.5 4.4 
2010 3.0 1 1.0 4.0 
2011 2.0 1 0.7 2.7 
2012 1.5 0 0.7 2.2 
2013 1.0 0 0.7 1.7 
2014 0.5 0 0.7 1.2 
2015 0 0 0.7 0.7 
2016 0 0 0.7 0.7 
2017 0 0 0.7 0.7 
2018 0 0 0.7 0.7 
Total 24.2 54 15.6 39.8 
 
 
2.7 PROBABILITY OF CONFLICT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Package 1 
 
In combination with the substantial existing level of external military assistance being 
provided through US military operations and ISAF, CP Package 1 would make a significant 
contribution to preventing conflict, providing confidence in the future for its citizens, 
encouraging rapid economic growth and consolidating the fragile finances of the Afghan 
Government.  The probability of conflict would therefore be substantially less than the 80% 
probability that we assume under the baseline scenario, in which current levels of external 
resource provision is frozen then reduced.  
 
At the same time, without additional security provision to fill the gap before government 
security forces can be sufficiently strengthened, this Package would be vulnerable to being 
derailed by powerful armed groups, both directly associated with Taliban / Al-Qaeda and by 
other actors with an interest in protecting illegal narcotic and resource extraction activities.  
Without physical security, moreover, it would be much harder to spread the benefits of the 
development package beyond the areas over which the government has effective control.  
Even if $4 billion a year can be spent without such control, therefore, it may widen inter-
regional disparities and contribute to further conflict.  It is possible that existing commitments 
of external security forces will be able to overcome these obstacles without leading to a 
downward spiral, but it remains somewhat unlikely.  We therefore assess the probability of 
large-scale conflict under CP Package 1 as being 40%. 
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 Probability of Conflict with Conflict Prevention Package 2 
 
CP Package 2, combining both a massive programme of economic assistance and a 
substantial expansion and extension of ISAF, would be more likely to ensure that large-scale 
conflict was prevented over the next 15 years, thus putting Afghanistan firmly on the 
transition to becoming a ‘normal’ low-income South Asian country.  Even this Package could 
not guarantee success were organised armed opposition to the Government and its foreign 
allies to intensify further.  A longer period of foreign ‘occupation’ could inflame hostile feelings 
among Afghans, and might also attract foreign Islamist fighters, as is already occurring in 
Iraq.  The success of the Afghanistan Government, moreover, still remains dependent on a 
relatively small number of personnel and on delicate political compromises between factional 
groups and ideological approaches.  Were these gains to collapse, even a much-enhanced 
international presence might not be sufficient to protect Afghanistan from a slide into civil war.  
 
On balance, therefore, we assess the probability of large-scale conflict under CP Package 2 
as being 20%.   
 
 
2.8 NET PRESENT VALUE AND ASSESSMENT 
 
This case study focuses on an ongoing conflict in which there is already substantial 
international community involvement.  It has sought to estimate the cost-effectiveness of 
undertaking two additional CP Packages, both of which are already being discussed widely, 
but neither of which has yet been allocated sufficient resources for its implementation.  The 
first package consists of the comprehensive assistance programme outlined by the 
Government of Afghanistan and international development organisations in March 2004, 
which it is estimated will cost around $4bn a year over the next seven years.  The second 
package also includes the deployment of a further 10,000 ISAF troops in order to provide 
higher levels of security in the areas of Afghanistan currently outside central government 
control.  The total costs of the two packages are estimated to be $24 billion and $40 billion 
over the next 15 years respectively, in addition to the $71 billion committed under current 
plans (most of which is needed for the continuing costs of US war-fighting operations).   
 
On the assumptions made in the paper, both CP Packages are cost-effective to the IC if they 
produce reductions in the probability of civil war of 7% and 12% respectively.  Unless the IC 
is confident that current levels of commitment to Afghanistan are sufficient to guarantee 
lasting peace, therefore, the case for further investment seems a strong one.  
 
This conclusion depends heavily on the assumptions that (a) a return to full-scale civil war in 
Afghanistan will increase the costs of countering international terrorism and repairing the 
damage it causes by 20%; (b) the current costs to the IC of the global narcotics trade will be 
reduced by 5% if opium production in Afghanistan can be sharply reduced, as we assume is 
the case in the peace scenario.  If either of these assumptions is diluted or removed, the 
cost-effectiveness of the Packages will be reduced.  If it is assumed, for example, that civil 
war in Afghanistan will only increase the costs of international terrorism by 10% (compared to 
what it would have been in the event of peace), and if peace has no discernible impact on 
the damage done by the narcotics trade (either because Afghan production is maintained, or 
because alternative production sources are easily developed), then the breakeven probability 
reductions for the two packages become 15% and 24% respectively.  
 
The prevention of conflict in Afghanistan would also have substantial benefits for Afghanistan 
itself and for its neighbours ($74 billion NPV, compared to an estimated $288 billion to the 
IC).  If these potential benefits are also included in the calculation, the breakeven reduction in 
probability at which the CP Packages are cost-effective will be lower than in the above 
illustrations. 
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 3.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This study posits a conflict scenario consisting of a small-scale and localised civil war in the 
Uzbekistan part of the Ferghana Valley and estimates that the net additional costs of conflict 
are US$31.6 billion in NPV at 2004 prices, broken up as follows: 
 
 to Uzbekistan: $27.3bn 
 to neighbouring states: $2.4bn 
 to international community: $1.9bn 
 
The paper presents two CP packages, one consisting of direct prevention measures and the 
second also including support for long term reform.  It estimates that, in order to be cost-
effective to the IC, the CP Packages should reduce the probability of large-scale conflict by 
10% and 28% respectively.  If the savings to Uzbekistan and its neighbours are also taken 
into account, the breakeven probabilities are much lower:  0.6% and 1.6% respectively.  
These low ‘breakeven’ probabilities reflect the relatively low costs of both CP Packages, 
costing $191m and $542m respectively over 15 years. 
 
Both Packages illustrate the merits, in terms of cost-effectiveness, of engaging in CP well 
before the onset of a conflict.  The packages are only equivalent to around one sixth of 
current ODA flows to Uzbekistan, currently $160m a year.  In our judgement, this is enough 
to provide effective CP packages that are well targeted, politically driven and regularly re-
assessed and reshaped.  
 
The study may underestimate the costs of the conflict to the IC.  First, costs that are incurred 
after 2018 are not included.  Second, the size of the UN post-conflict force is assumed to be 
around 1000 personnel.  If the perceived importance of Uzbekistan grows, a larger 
commitment may be possible.  Third, the study makes no allowance for the conflict’s impact 
on the incidence of international terrorism or the global availability of narcotics (including 
transit trade from Afghanistan). 
 
One obstacle to the implementation of parts of the packages proposed here could be the 
willingness of the Uzbekistan government to allow their implementation.  External support to 
opposition groups, human rights groups or independent media might, for example, meet such 
resistance.  Similarly, the government is unlikely to view favourably the opening of OSCE 
offices in the Ferghana Valley.  Both packages are designed as influencing strategies and 
the IC would need to implement those parts of the packages that it could.  However at the 
core of both packages lies a suite of diplomatic pressures and dialogue, backed up by tough 
conditionality and sensitive implementation.  As long as the Government of Uzbekistan 
remains relatively dependent on international support (including ODA), it will not be able to 
oppose implementation of most elements of the package.  On the other hand, the fewer entry 
points the IC has (or is prepared to use), the less likely any CP measures are to work.  
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 3.2 INTRODUCTION 
 
This case study considers the relative costs of conflict prevention and post-conflict 
intervention for the state of Uzbekistan during the period 2004-2018.  
 
Uzbekistan is situated in Central Asia, and is a former Soviet republic that gained its 
independence in 1991.  It is home to 26m people, of whom 6.4m live in the arable and 
densely populated Ferghana Valley, on which much of this case study concentrates.  
Uzbekistan is bordered by five states, namely, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. 
 
Uzbekistan faces the potential for conflict on a number of levels, including inter-state conflict.  
This case study concentrates on the potential for violent internal conflict, arising primarily 
between the government of Uzbekistan, a number of non-state actors and groups, including 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)24 and Hizb-ut-Tahrir,25 and the general population 
of the Ferghana Valley. 
 
International engagement in Uzbekistan in the economic sphere has been significant.  A 
number of international organisations are represented there, including the World Bank, IMF, 
UNDP, and OSCE.  Engagement rose significantly following 11 September 2001, after which 
the US established a military presence inside Uzbekistan and significantly increased ODA 
flows to the country.  Uzbekistan has been involved to some degree in attempts at closer 
regional cooperation, in particular through the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.  This 
has involved important security dimensions, though progress in co-operative measures has 
been constrained.   The engagement by major powers with security in Uzbekistan has not 
been addressed so much to the problem of root causes of domestic conflict or conflict 
prevention as it has to the law enforcement aspects and support for military operations in 
Afghanistan.  The Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been 
pressuring the government of Uzbekistan to respect human rights and this would contribute 
to conflict prevention goals if this pressure were having any effect.  The international 
community is currently sending mixed messages to the government of Uzbekistan, 
particularly with regard to state responses to terrorism and the relative importance of human 
rights and freedom of religion.  There is no evidence of any attempt by international actors to 
engage with either Hizb-ut-Tahrir or the IMU as legitimate opposition groups that need to be 
brought into political dialogue.  No comprehensive approach is being deployed by any one 
international actor, nor by the international community as a whole.   
 
A primary cause of internal conflict is the behaviour of the authoritarian Uzbek government. 
The suppression of political activity and non-official Islam, and widespread human rights 
abuses, combine with economic hardship and widespread rural poverty to alienate large 
parts of the population. The potential for violent conflict arises from the possibility of one or 
all of the IMU, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the democratic opposition movements, or the Uzbek population 
at large, mobilising to use violence in response to these factors. 
                                                 
24 The IMU is an armed opposition group, included by the USA after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York 
in its list of terrorist organisations. The IMU advocates the overthrow of the government of Uzbekistan as one of its aims.  
In the past, it has launched cross border incursions into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and has been accused by the 
government of Uzbekistan of being behind the bombings in Tashkent in February 1999. The IMU was also involved in high 
profile kidnappings in Kyrgyzstan during 1999 and 2000. The IMU and its leadership have frequently used Afghanistan as a 
base of operations, and the organisation is thought to have close ties to both the Taliban and the al-Qaeda terrorist 
network. 
25  Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation) is a radical Islamist movement that advocates the overthrow of 
governments throughout the Muslim world and their replacement by an Islamic state in the form of a recreated Caliphate.  
It is apparently opposed to the use of violence, but is forced to remain underground in Uzbekistan. 
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 There has been considerable international attention paid to the prospect of inter-ethnic 
violence (between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, or possibly Tajiks) in the Ferghana Valley that 
straddles the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but this is a more likely 
source of tension in Kyrgyzstan than in Uzbekistan.  Whilst the possibility of inter-ethnic 
conflict does remain, this paper argues that the sources of conflict in Uzbekistan are wider 
and a more strategic approach needs to be employed. 
 
The case study firstly outlines a ‘conflict scenario’ and a ‘peace scenario’ for Uzbekistan for 
the next 15 years.  These represent hypothetical, but realistic and representative, 
possibilities for the development of conflict in Uzbekistan.  The costs of violent conflict 
breaking out are then examined, both for Uzbekistan itself, for neighbours and for the wider 
international community.  Two comprehensive conflict prevention packages are proposed 
and outlined in detail.  Both are flexible, designed to respond to events and opportunities as 
they unfold over the next fifteen years.  The first package (CP1) concentrates on direct or 
short term measures, while the second (CP2) adds in structural conflict prevention measures. 
The financial cost implications of both packages are examined. 
 
 
3.3 PEACE AND CONFLICT SCENARIOS  
 
Conflict Scenario 
 
The conflict scenario in this study is about localised, though serious, violent conflict occurring 
in a small finger of territory (the Uzbekistan part of the Ferghana Valley) that is 
geographically distinct from and easily cut off from the rest of the country.  It essentially 
involves a capital city ruling elite versus a community-based society, one that is more 
traditional and one that has been marginalised and oppressed.  The prospects for violence in 
this area have been enhanced by its high population density relative to the rest of the country. 
 
The end point of the scenario is significant armed conflict in the form of a small-scale and 
localised civil war in the Ferghana Valley, in which a number of opponents of the regime 
mobilise significant numbers of the civilian population to engage in armed violence against the 
security forces of Uzbekistan.  By this stage of the scenario, violent clashes or incidents are 
occurring at the rate of four or five per day in different parts of the Valley and occasionally in or 
around Tashkent, the capital.  Deaths are in the region of 3000 a year, with many more injured.  
There is widespread damage to property and mass displacement of the population.  By 
comparison, in the Tajikistan Civil war (1992-1997), an estimated 50,000 people died and some 
600,000 people were displaced inside the country.  Houses, roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, 
water systems and other key infrastructure facilities were destroyed. 
 
The chances of this, or any other, large-scale armed conflict within the next four years 
are relatively limited.  The main danger is that a continuation of current political and 
economic trends progressively prepares the ground for future conflict some time in 
the 10-15 year time frame.  Factors contributing towards this trend include the 
suppression of opposition political activity and non-official Islam, widespread human 
rights violations by government, continuing deterioration of the economic situation 
and worsening rural poverty. 
 
In this scenario, the combination of these factors results in a spread of protests against local 
and central government, particularly in the Ferghana Valley.26  These protests are met with 
increasing oppression from the security forces, radicalising previously passive elements of 
the population and generating more resistance.  Hizb ut-Tahrir enjoys a steady rise in 
                                                 
26  The situation is complicated by the fact that there are also large numbers of ethnic Uzbeks living in the Kyrgyz parts of the 
Valley, several Uzbek enclaves within Kyrgyzstan, and large numbers of ethnic Tajiks and Kyrgyz in the Uzbek part, with 
some inter-ethnic tensions. 
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 membership, and the IMU renews its attacks from outside Uzbekistan.  Meanwhile, the 
declining health of President Karimov leads to damaging infighting within the elite over 
political succession. 
 
Other possible sources of conflict exacerbate the medium-term potential for conflict.  The 
commissions working on the delimitation of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border could break down.  
Border crossings could become increasingly difficult, as harassment, extortion and corruption 
by border officials – already at high levels – intensify.  Violent border incidents and 
exchanges of small arms fire could become more frequent, with Uzbekistan continuing to 
mine its borders and the gas/water dispute with Kyrgyzstan worsening. 
  
In the scenario, discontent, fuelled by the oppressive response of the government, results in 
the growth of organised violence, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, by the end of this 
decade.  Islam is increasingly used as a basis for mobilising opposition to the regime.  As 
circumstances worsen, the IMU establishes a stronger foothold within Uzbekistan’s part of 
the Ferghana Valley and launches a small number of terrorist attacks in Tashkent.  The 
leadership struggle within the political elite is settled in favour of an ally of Karimov, but the 
new leader attempts to consolidate control through continued repression.  
 
Many people turn to illegal economic activity in order to survive.  This includes drug 
smuggling, which is also linked to radical armed groups.  In an attempt to combat these 
trends, borders are frequently closed.  Several border incidents cause deaths of both 
civilians and military personnel, worsening diplomatic relations with neighbouring states.  The 
Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan water/gas dispute results in falling reservoir levels, a lack of irrigation 
water and subsequent crop failures. 
 
The probability of large-scale armed conflict increases over time in the conflict scenario, with 
the Ferghana Valley becoming a base for resistance and for sporadic attacks on the rest of 
Uzbekistan.  Attempts by security forces to regain control of the Valley result in mass arrests, 
a declaration of a ‘state of emergency’ and guerrilla warfare.  There could be around 3000 
conflict-related deaths annually, widespread damage to property and up to 1 million people 
displaced from their homes.  Many of the casualties are caused by indiscriminate targeting 
by government forces of civilian targets by way of reprisal.  Most of the incidents by the 
armed opposition would be hit and run raids on civilian or police targets or isolated military 
units, or personnel, rather than full force on force engagements.  Where these do occur, the 
clashes usually involve less than 50 combatants on each side.  Attacks on suspected IMU 
bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could include bombing raids by the Uzbek air force and 
could thus generate new inter-state tensions. 
 
The fighting is highly concentrated (localised) in the Ferghana Valley, around the towns of 
Namangan, Ferghana and Andizhon.  This is a geographically discrete area of the country, 
accessible from the capital Tashkent by only one major road or by roads that pass through 
neighbouring countries.  All of these roads can be affected quite seriously by winter weather.  
The Valley is about 5 per cent of Uzbekistan’s territory, but has about 25 per cent of the 
population living on 37 per cent of the country’s arable land.  
 
As remaining international investors lose confidence in the economic and political situation 
and withdraw, economic discontent starts to affect traditionally more prosperous urban areas, 
particularly as food shortages develop when supply from the Ferghana Valley is disrupted.  
This leads to occasional but serious rioting in urban areas.  Although civil unrest in the capital 
is quickly brought under control by force, political instability is increased and low-intensity 
warfare in the Ferghana Valley continues for several years. 
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 Peace Scenario 
 
Peace is defined here as being the absence of large-scale violent conflict during 2004-
2018.  As discussed above, medium term risks of conflict in Uzbekistan result from the 
continuation and deepening of current political and economic trends.  Our 
representative ‘peace scenario’, by contrast, assumes a gradual reversal of these 
trends, which in turn reduces the chances of conflict.  Of course, there is no 
mechanistic relationship between these trends and the advent of conflict.  For the 
purposes of establishing baselines against which CP packages can be assessed, 
however, the mapping out of two representative scenarios is a useful exercise. 
 
In the peace scenario, the government begins to embark on limited but significant reforms 
during 2004-2009.  Restrictions on secular political parties, civil society and the press are 
reduced.  Pressure on religious and human rights groups abates and the Muftiate is given 
greater independence.  There are amnesties for some political and religious prisoners and 
there are fewer mass arrests.  The use of torture in prisons is reduced, as steps are taken to 
improve Uzbekistan’s negative image on human rights.  At the same time, the government is 
working to achieve IMF economic targets.  It is also reducing obstacles to the development of 
the private sector; lifts restrictions on private trade and enterprise and implements strategies 
to tackle rural poverty.  Although terrorist incidents continue, the authorities react in a manner 
designed to avoid alienation of the wider population from the government.  
 
After 2009, in this scenario, reforms build on the progress of the previous five years.  
Parliamentary elections are contested by three principle parties and monitored by the 
international community, although the campaign is marred by violations.  A programme of 
security sector reform is slowly starting to produce visible results. 
 
Since the government meets minimum requirements for basic economic, political and human 
rights reforms, the international community starts to engage more in the economy.  
Sustained investment flows to social infrastructure (particularly health and education) and 
promoting sustainable livelihoods, although unemployment remains a significant problem.  
Whilst some protests continue, many citizens of Uzbekistan now feel that they have a 
livelihood and are able to sustain their standard of living.  Key groups feel less marginalised 
and persecuted and the population finds new ways to express their grievances within the 
political system. 
 
On an international level, the border demarcation commissions complete their work, although 
agreements have yet to be reached over access to enclaves of Uzbekistan territory within the 
borders of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  Visa requirements and border crossing procedures are 
simplified.  Harassment, extortion and corruption among border officials is being brought 
under control.  Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan start serious negotiations concerning the supply 
of gas and water. 
 
Finally, during 2014-2018, new parliamentary and presidential elections are held and these 
are largely free and fair and are contested by a wide variety of parties and candidates.  A 
vibrant civil society is developing and Islamic political groups and parties are legalised as 
long as they do not espouse violence.  Religious rights are enshrined in law.  Political and 
economic reforms generate rising domestic and international confidence.  A more 
independent judiciary is now able to provide a more stable legal environment, although 
corruption still persists.  More private investors are showing an interest in the Uzbek 
economy.  Relations with neighbouring states improve considerably.  There have been no 
violent border incidents for the past two years. The resolution of border demarcation issues 
has promoted greater co-operation on other issues, including water, gas, and trade.  A 
regional co-operation structure is beginning to function effectively. 
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 3.4 ADDITIONAL ANNUAL COSTS OF THE CONFLICT SCENARIO 
 
The following pages examine the additional annual financial costs of the conflict scenario 
(compared to the peace scenario) in Uzbekistan over the period 2004-2018.  Both direct 
costs and indirect costs (such as estimated economic losses) are examined. 
 
Additional costs to Uzbekistan  
 
Establishing a baseline for estimates of the cost of conflict to Uzbekistan is difficult given the 
relative weakness of available official statistics.  Our conservative estimate for total costs to 
Uzbekistan over the 15 years of the conflict scenario amounts to $5.6bn at 2004 prices. 
 
Direct costs 
 
The most significant direct cost would be increased expenditure on the military and internal 
security forces.  Estimates of expenditure on military forces in 2001 vary from 1.1 per cent of 
GDP (UNDP) to 2.8% of GDP (IISS).27  No detailed figures are available for expenditure on 
internal security forces, but some additional amount needs to be added to military spending 
for this purpose.  Here we conservatively use an annual estimated spend of $246 million in 
2004 for military and internal security forces and agencies (2 per cent of GDP) as a 
baseline. 28   Assuming incremental increases in expenditure on the military and internal 
security forces in the conflict scenario to reach 5 per cent of GDP for 2014-2018, contrasted 
with maintaining the current level of forces and equipment (and reducing defence’s share in 
GDP) in the peace scenario, the additional cost could amount to $4.832bn in 2004 prices 
over 15 years.29 
                                                 
27  UNDP, Uzbekistan: Human Development Indicators 2003, (www.undp.org/ hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_UZB.html) estimates 
spending at $120m, or 1.1% of GDP. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2003-2004, Table 33, 
estimates spending at 2.8% of GDP in 2001.  
28  This is rather less than average developing country levels. Hoeffler and Reynal-Queral suggest that during peacetime the 
average developing country spends about 2.8% of GDP on the military. During civil war this increases to 5%. Anke Hoeffler 
& Marta Reynal-Queral, Measuring the Costs of Conflict, March 2003. 
29  Using a higher ‘baseline’ level of security sector spending (e.g. 3% of GDP) would make no difference to this estimate of 
additional costs, provided that the increase as a result of conflict were the same (in this example, to 6% of GDP).  
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 Table 1: Additional Defence and other Spending in Conflict ($m 2004 prices) 
 
Year 
GDP in 
Conflict 
GDP 
Growt
h 
% 
Security 
Sector as 
share of 
GDP  % 
Security 
Budget in 
Conflict 
Security 
Budget in 
Peace 
Savings 
in 
Security 
Budget 
Other 
Direct 
Costs 
2004 12,300  2 246 246 0 0 
2005 12,853 4.5 2.3 296 246 50 0 
2006 13,432 4.5 2.6 349 246 103 0 
2007 14,036 4.5 2.9 407 246 161 0 
2008 14,668 4.5 3 440 246 194 0 
2009 15,255 4 3.3 503 246 257 0 
2010 15,712 3 3.6 566 246 320 0 
2011 16,026 2 3.9 625 246 379 0 
2012 16,026 0 4 641 246 395 110 
2013 15,866 -1 4.5 714 246 468 110 
2014 15,549 -2 5 777 246 531 110 
2015 15,238 -2 5 762 246 516 110 
2016 14,933 -2 5 747 246 501 110 
2017 14,635 -2 5 732 246 486 110 
2018 14,342 -2 5 717 246 471 110 
TOTAL    8,522 3,690 4,832 770 
 
 
Over the period from 2012, the total losses through destruction and damage to capital assets 
and infrastructure could be in the region of $110m per year (based on 20 major public 
buildings, such as schools or hospitals, totally destroyed each year), around $80m being 
sustained in the Ferghana Valley during the civil war and $30m of damage being inflicted on 
the capital through terrorist attacks and rioting.  There is at least one road tunnel on the main 
road linking Tashkent to the Ferghana Valley and this could well be the target of repeated 
terrorist attacks.  While the estimates for total infrastructure damage seem low, it must be 
remembered that the Ferghana Valley is a rural area with little civil infrastructure apart from 
schools and clinics.  The US$ price conceals the exchange rate and the cost of buildings in 
local currency is quite low when expressed in US dollars.30  The most important infrastructure 
elements in the region are the irrigation channels without which most of the population would 
essentially starve.  The conflict scenario assumes no significant attacks on the water 
infrastructure.  The total cost of care for a potential 800,000 IDPs is also likely to be 
significant, around $240m per year.  However, most of this is likely to be borne by the 
international community, with Uzbekistan providing perhaps $30m a year from 2012. 
                                                 
30  Sample project costs from 2003 include $17,000 for the repair and rehabilitation of three water wells, in addition to the 
construction of a 3.5 kilometre water pipeline, with 52 public tap stands. Reconstruction, renovation and refurbishment of 
Tashkent airport, including baggage handling equipment, cost $48 million. Refurbishment of the hot water supply (provided 
from a central water heating ‘factory’) in the town of Andijan cost $15 million. 
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 Indirect costs (loss of national income) 
 
The 15-year conflict scenario could cost Uzbekistan $35 bn in lost GDP growth.  This 
assumes an average growth of 4.5 per cent over the next fifteen years in the peace scenario 
(although the potential for growth if economic reforms were introduced and foreign 
investment increased could be substantially greater), compared with growth in the conflict 
scenario being sustained at 4.5 per cent over the next four years, but then declining to 2 per 
cent.  (Growth between 1990 and 2001 averaged –1.5 per cent with no substantive conflict). 
The 4.5% annual growth rate is based on a continuation of trends in 2000-2002.31 
 
Table 2: Projected Loss in GDP Growth as a result of Conflict ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year 
GDP in 
Conflict 
GDP growth 
% 
GDP in 
Peace Lost National Income 
2004 12.3  12.300 0.000 
2005 12.853 4.5 12.854 0.000 
2006 13.431 4.5 13.432 0.000 
2007 14.036 4.5 14.036 0.000 
2008 14.667 4.5 14.668 0.000 
2009 15.254 4.0 15.328 0.073 
2010 15.712 3.0 16.018 0.305 
2011 16.026 2.0 16.739 0.712 
2012 16.026 0 17.492 1.465 
2013 15.866 -1.0 18.279 2.413 
2014 15.548 -2.0 19.102 3.553 
2015 15.238 -2.0 19.961 4.723 
2016 14.933 -2.0 20.859 5.926 
2017 14.634 -2.0 21.798 7.163 
2018 14.341 -2.0 22.779 8.437 
Total 221  256 35 
 
 
These figures may underestimate GDP loss.  Agriculture, which accounts for 36 per cent of 
GDP,32 is concentrated in the intensely cultivated Ferghana Valley and would be particularly 
severely affected by conflict there.  Uzbekistan is now the world's second-largest cotton 
exporter, but this important crop is heavily reliant on water sources which originate in 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and may be disrupted in the case of conflict.33  Growth would 
also be lost by income foregone from investment outside the gas sector.  There would, 
however, be some considerable compensation for losses from agriculture by increased 
national income from natural gas revenue from the Caspian Sea and this income, growing 
year on year, would remain unaffected by the civil violence at the other end of the country.  
The Caspian coast of Uzbekistan is a sparsely inhabited part of the country, poorly 
connected by road or rail.  
 
                                                 
31  GDP growth was 4.5% in 2001 and 4.2% in 2002. WB, Uzbekistan Country Brief, 2002; WB, World Development Report 
2004, 2004, p. 253. 
32  CIA Factbook 2003:  http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uz.html 
33  For example, if the conflict means power supplies to Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan are disrupted, Kyrgyzstan may choose to 
generate more of its own hydro-electricity in winter by releasing water from its reservoirs. 
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 Other human development costs of the conflict 
 
In addition to the losses already outlined above, the civil war would have important 
consequences on human development.  The diversion of resources into military and security 
expenditure and the disruption created by the conflict, would have a negative effect on 
provision of social services, including health and education. 
 
Human development indicators for the region at the start of the period were not that 
impressive.  Life expectancy and other key indicators of human development had declined in 
the decade after the collapse of the USSR.  The ‘share of GDP being spent on health and 
education dropped by roughly one third between 1992 and 1998, even as GDP per capita 
increased marginally; the number of visits to medical clinics doubled; the number of hospital 
beds shrank by 75 per cent; public pre-schools (kindergartens) became almost non-existent; 
and there was a precipitous decline in birth-rates throughout the country between 1993 and 
1998, of the order of 25 per cent nationally and higher in some rural areas’.34 
 
Table 3: Human Development Indicators for Uzbekistan 1989, 2001, 201335 
 
Year 1989 2001 2013 Peace 
Scenario 
2013 Conflict 
Scenario 
Per Capita GDP 
US$PPP 
2950 2460 4000 2000 
HDI 0.729 0.728 0.750 0.700 
Life expectancy n/a 69.3 71 65 
Infant mortality per 1000 
births 
n/a 52 48 54 
 
 
Additional costs to the neighbouring countries 
 
The localised civil war in the Uzbekistan part of the Ferghana Valley would only have 
significant economic or financial effects on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
 
Direct costs 
 
The principal direct cost is assumed to be the destruction of physical infrastructure of $10 
million, for example if the Uzbekistan air force bombs suspected IMU bases or positions in 
these countries.  These two countries are also likely to incur significant extra military costs as 
they attempt to secure their borders and contain the conflict within Uzbekistan.  These extra 
military costs could amount to $20m a year ($10m each).36 
 
The cost of caring for up to 100,000 refugees, the majority of whom would flee to either 
Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan, could be $30m per year.37  Although the majority of this expense 
would be covered by the international community, the cumulative cost of hosting these 
                                                 
34  UNDP, Uzbekistan: Human Development Report 1999, pp. 74, 79, 82. See ICG Report, ‘Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in 
Three States’, Asia Report No. 7, 7 August 2000, p. 14.   
35  For base indicators (2001), see UNDP, Human Development Report 2003.  
36  In 2001Kyrgyzstan was spending between US$19.2 million and US$25.5 million annually on its military.  Estimates for 
Tajikistan’s military expenditure vary more widely, between US$13.2m and $35.6m  (Sources: UNDP Human Development 
Indicators, and CIA World Factbook 2003) 
37  The UN Consolidated Appeal for the North Caucasus (Chechnya and Ingushetia) is requesting US$62m for 2004 to 
provide assistance to around 1m people.  However, many of these are still resident in Chechnya, and a large percentage of 
IDPs have found shelter with host families in Ingushetia.  The Russian government also provides more assistance than 
Central Asian governments are likely to do.  The per capita figure is therefore considerably higher in our scenario. 
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 refugees could cost the countries of the region $18m over the period 2012 – 2018, although 
these costs would also extend considerably beyond 2018 and the period of this case study. 
 
Indirect costs 
 
These will be represented primarily by the knock-on effects of the direct costs outlined above 
and by a general downturn in the economic prosperity and potential of the neighbours, as 
they become associated with instability, and thus investment declines.  In the conflict 
scenario we assume a fall in annual GDP growth over the fifteen years from 5 per cent to 3 
per cent in the case of Kyrgyzstan and from 4 per cent to 2 per cent in the case of Tajikistan. 
Increased government spending on border security crowds out other government investment 
and FDI (totalling $27.6m in 2001 for these two countries) is deterred.  Damage to 
infrastructure, the disruption to economies which are still heavily interlinked and the loss of 
human capital, would also all have a negative effect on growth.  The result is a cumulative 
loss of $3.35bn over 10 years from 2009, as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Estimated GDP Loss for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ($bn 2004 prices) 
 
Year Conflict 
Kyrgystan 
growth 
rate % 
Tajikistan 
growth 
rate % Peace 
Kyrgystan 
growth 
rate % 
Tajikistan 
growth rate 
% 
Net 
Loss 
2004 2.88   2.88   0 
2005 3.02 5 4 3.02 5 4 0 
2006 3.15 5 4 3.15 5 4 0 
2007 3.29 5 4 3.29 5 4 0 
2008 3.45 5 4 3.45 5 4 0 
2009 3.57 3 2 3.60 5 4 0.03 
2010 3.70 3 2 3.77 5 4 0.07 
2011 3.83 3 2 3.94 5 4 0.11 
2012 3.97 3 2 4.12 5 4 0.15 
2013 4.07 3 2 4.31 5 4 0.24 
2014 4.18 3 2 4.51 5 4 0.33 
2015 4.29 3 2 4.72 5 4 0.43 
2016 4.40 3 2 4.94 5 4 0.54 
2017 4.51 3 2 5.17 5 4 0.65 
2018 4.63 3 2 5.40 5 4 0.77 
Total 56.93   60.28   3.35 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in providing emergency 
assistance and in coping with other costs from the conflict 
 
The costs of emergency assistance would be considerable, and likely to be sustained over a 
long period of time.  Groups in need of assistance would include: 
 
• 100,000 refugees in neighbouring states in need of shelter, food aid and protection.  
Annual cost: $30m 
• 800,000 IDPs within Uzbekistan in need of shelter, food aid and protection.   
 Annual cost: $240m 
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 • 300,000 residents of Uzbekistan in need of food aid and supplementary feeding.  
Annual cost: $80m 
 
Given the resources of Uzbekistan and neighbouring states, we assume that the international 
community would have to cover the majority of these costs, at an annual rate of $320m from 
2012. 
 
The conflict may also generate other, less quantifiable costs to the international community.  
Uzbekistan has not so far been a centre for international terrorism or other threats to the 
international community, but a more active IMU might establish closer links with international 
terrorist networks.  If, as a result of the Uzbek conflict, more personnel were recruited by 
those networks for terrorist operations elsewhere (for example, in Russia, Afghanistan, or 
Western Europe), then the costs to those other countries would be very considerable indeed. 
 
Although Uzbekistan is an important source of oil and natural gas, these reserves are located 
in the west of the country.  Given that our conflict scenario envisages armed conflict 
remaining largely confined to the Ferghana Valley, with occasional attacks in the capital, the 
operations of oil companies are unlikely to be substantially affected. 
 
Uzbekistan is a transit area for drugs from Afghanistan.  The drug traffic is already extensive 
and is not likely to increase as a result of the conflict scenario. 
 
Additional direct costs to the wider international community in stopping the conflict 
after it has started 
 
Given the geo-strategic importance of Uzbekistan and the region to a number of key 
international actors (US, EU, Russia), the international community would be likely to mobilise 
significant resources to attempt to halt violent conflict if it broke out.  Uzbekistan neighbours 
Afghanistan, contains significant oil and gas reserves and is a major power in the region and 
an important ally of the US in its ‘war on terrorism’  There would be a strong imperative to 
avoid a similar situation to that which occurred in Afghanistan, particularly if the IMU is 
regarded as a terrorist organisation, which could potentially directly threaten Western 
interests.  
  
At a minimum, therefore, we assume that major states (US, EU, Russia) and international 
organisations (UN, OSCE) would respond to conflict by engaging in intense diplomatic 
activity, including visits by high-ranking politicians and officials, the appointment of a special 
representative and support staff and a considerably enhanced diplomatic engagement in the 
region.  Estimated annual cost: $5m. 
 
Given Uzbekistan’s importance, we assume that there is a 50% probability that the 
international community will come to the conclusion that it has to deploy military forces to 
intervene during the conflict, in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and possibly 
the protection of civilians.  The scale of assumed military deployment is of the order of 1000 
military and civilian personnel, supported by a two squadrons of helicopters.38  The force 
could be accompanied by a large-scale deployment of international civilian staff under the 
auspices of the OSCE, to monitor a ceasefire and establish the foundations for a broader 
post-conflict engagement by the international community.  Such a deployment (military plus 
civilian) is assumed to cost $180m a year in 2004 prices.  The conflict would also have left a 
large number of small arms in the hands of the civilian population and would have completely 
discredited the internal security forces.  A large-scale programme of DDR would therefore be 
                                                 
38  The average annual cost of the UN peacekeeping force in Tajikistan between 1994 and 1999 was $10 million. This was an 
observer force that peaked at just over 120 personnel. Its costs in the last year of operations was $14 million. The cost of 
the UN mission in Georgia for 2003/04 was budgeted at $32million. This comprised: 127 international military personnel, 
102 international civilian personnel and 179 locally engaged staff. See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions. 
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 necessary, costing around $5m a year.  The total cost to the wider international community in 
simply stopping the violence after it had broken out using a peacekeeping package five times 
the size of the Georgia package could thus easily amount to $190m a year, totalling $950 
million over the period 2014-2019.  In reality this commitment would have to be sustained 
beyond this period, and combined with reconstruction and rehabilitation costs in the region of 
$300 million per year, but much of this would fall outside the 15 year period of the scenario.  
These figures need to be weighted by the probability of the peacekeeping mission actually 
taking place since it would not be a certain outcome of the conflict.  Adjusted for the 50% 
probability assumed above, the additional cost is reduced to $97 m per year. 
 
Summary of costs of conflict for period 2004-2018 
 
Table 5 provides a summary of additional costs to Uzbekistan, neighbouring states 
and the international community of the conflict scenario relative to the peace 
scenario. 
 
Table 5: Summary of costs of conflict for period 2004-2018 ($m 2004 prices) 
 
Year  
Additional costs to 
state of Uzbekistan 
 
Additional costs to 
neighbouring states
Additional 
costs to IC 
of 
emergency 
assistance 
Additional 
costs to IC 
of 
intervention 
to stop 
conflict 
 Direct Indirect Direct Indirect   
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 50 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 103 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 161 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 194 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 257 0 0 34 0 0 
2010 320 305 20 72 0 0 
2011 379 712 20 112 0 0 
2012 505 1465 22 155 320 0 
2013 578 2413 26 242 320 0 
2014 696 3553 25 335 320 97 
2015 682 4723 24 436 320 97 
2016 666 5926 24 539 320 97 
2017 651 7163 24 651 320 97 
2018 636 8437 23 772 320 97 
Total 
(US$m) 5602 34,771 208 3350 2240 485 
Total $5.6bn $34.8bn $0.2bn $3.3bn $2.2bn $0.49bn 
 
Total additional costs to Uzbekistan: $40.40bn 
Total additional costs to neighbouring states: $3.50bn 
Total additional costs to international community: $2.69bn 
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 The continuing costs to Uzbekistan, neighbours and the IC after 2018 are not included in this 
assessment.  Inter-alia, these include the reconstruction and rehabilitation costs that will be 
incurred after the conflict ends (possibly $3bn to the international community), as well as the 
costs to the international community of rehabilitating regional economies in the long-term. 
 
3.5 PROBABILITY OF THE CONFLICT WITHOUT CONFLICT PREVENTION 
PACKAGES 
 
This section assesses the probability of the scenario of ‘significant armed conflict’ developing 
in the next 15 years, without a comprehensive conflict prevention package.  The outbreak of 
such conflict at any one time requires the presence of three key variables: a crackdown by 
the state and security forces, a reaction by the civilian population and ability and readiness of 
the IMU to engage in violence.39 
 
Without a comprehensive conflict prevention package, we estimate that the probability of 
armed conflict breaking out in Uzbekistan during the next 15 years is high (around 70 per 
cent).  Whilst the probability remains relatively low over the next five years, tensions will 
continue to build over, with a fair chance (about 25 to 50 per cent) that they will precipitate at 
least one major violent incident by 2009.  Once such an incident has occurred, and elicited a 
harsh response from the state, the chances of violent conflict occurring increase 
considerably.  Non-state actors will continue to organise over the next five years and would 
be in a better position to respond with violence. Violent actions by both sides could then 
easily combine with long-standing grievances to fuel a self-reinforcing cycle of rising tensions 
and new violence. 
 
Without more sustained international engagement, there is little to suggest that the situation 
within Uzbekistan will improve.  In 2003, there was continued harassment of opposition 
parties, Birlik and Erk, and the former was refused registration.  Uzbekistan has yet to start to 
implement the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and continues to 
deny some of his main findings.  Security forces continue to raid the homes of suspected 
Muslim radicals and to arrest suspected members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir.  Uzbeks trying to 
smuggle cotton out of the country in order to sell it for higher prices in Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan have been subjected to arrests and beatings.  Even though some progress has 
been made in implementing IMF macro-economic reforms, this has been offset by the 
introduction of new laws that restrict trade and have devastated local markets and 
economies. 
 
Whilst the probability for the start of significant violent conflict before 2009 is currently low 
(about 10 per cent), public protests, prompted by a range of grievances, have been 
increasing, indicating less fear of the consequences of such actions, coupled with a sense 
that the government is less able to maintain rigid control.  This trend is set to continue and 
will be difficult to reverse.  Hizb-ut-Tahrir now has 15,000 - 20,000 members in Central Asia.  
Whilst support for the IMU remains low, there is a risk that this could grow as frustrations 
build and there remains a lack of alternative outlets for its expression.  There are some 
indications that the IMU is trying to re-group, although these are difficult to substantiate. 
 
Given this steady build-up in tensions and protests, it is quite possible that a relatively small 
incident could precipitate a considerable deterioration of the situation in the period after 2009.  
In the context of the Ferghana Valley and Uzbekistan, there is evidence to suggest that a 
relatively small incident could provoke much wider violence and thus the probability of 
conflict rises over time, as the probability of such an incident occurring increases. 
                                                 
39  In 1999, for example, following a series of bomb explosions in Tashkent, which were blamed on the IMU, the Uzbek 
government instigated a widespread crack-down on religious and opposition groups.  Over 30 people were convicted for 
the bombings and at least 19 executed. However, there was no outbreak of widespread violence, due primarily to the fact 
that the population as a whole were not prepared to mobilise in favour of violence. 
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 Once violence did break out, it would be likely to be sustained and self-perpetuating.  The 
internal security forces have significant military assets at their disposal and the opposition 
groups would have used the intervening period from 2004 to the outbreak of conflict, to 
organise and acquire weaponry.  Whilst the conflict would be fought primarily with small arms, 
the impact on the local population would still be devastating.  Human rights abuses would be 
widespread, ensuring a bitter conflict that would be difficult to stop. 
 
3.6 CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
Despite the small chance (perhaps 10 per cent) of significant armed conflict in the next five 
years, there is a strong case for concerted international action aimed at conflict prevention 
now, in order to prevent the spark of violence that has the potential to generate a rapid 
deterioration in the situation towards much more widespread violence. 
 
Although a number of international actors are currently financing ‘conflict prevention’ 
packages in Uzbekistan, current international engagement is not sufficient to significantly 
reduce the chances of the outbreak of armed conflict.  There is a lack of coherence both 
within individual actors’ approaches (many are ‘projectised’) and within the international 
community as a whole.  Mixed messages are being sent to the Uzbek government, 
particularly with regard to state responses to terrorism and the relative importance of human 
rights and freedom of religion.  Many current conflict-prevention interventions focus on inter-
ethnic conflict, often in the Ferghana Valley.  Whilst these questions are important, the 
sources of conflict in Uzbekistan are wider and a strategic approach needs to be employed. 
 
This section therefore outlines two additional conflict prevention packages (see Table 6 and 
Annex) that aim to prevent the outbreak of serious violent internal conflict within Uzbekistan, as 
described in the conflict scenario above.  Package One (CP1) is a suite of direct measures 
targeted at key leaders and groups, while Package Two (CP2) includes the measures in CP1 
and adds a range of structural measures aimed at institutional reform (both organisational and 
social). 
 
The composition of the two packages has been informed by the lessons-learned literature in 
the field of conflict prevention, including a recent study undertaken with part UK funding by 
the International Peace Academy in New York.  This study concluded, on the basis of a large 
number of case studies, that conflict prevention was least likely to succeed where only a few 
measures were deployed and where significant causes of conflict were left unaddressed.40  
Thus CP1 and CP2 each aim for comprehensive coverage of the main targets, the former 
concentrating on changing people’s views, the second incorporating both that approach and 
also targeting institutional reform.  The aim of a comprehensive conflict prevention package 
is to position the international community with entry points for influence in most of the main 
leadership groups, institutions and communities at relatively low cost. 
 
Both packages focus on targeting the key groups in Uzbekistan who have the potential to 
mobilise violence.  In both cases, the strategy focuses on five key aims: 
 
1. promoting accountable government, political participation, and the protection of 
human rights 
2. developing accountable security forces and an end to impunity for human rights 
abuses and torture 
                                                 
40 Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Insights from the Cases: Opportunities and Challenges for Preventive Actors’, in Chandra Lekha 
Sriram and Karin Wermester (eds), From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent 
Conflict, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder CO, 2003, pp. 355-356. 
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 3. preventing key groups from mobilising the population of the Ferghana Valley to 
violence, whilst also laying the foundations for wider participation in political 
and economic life 
4. engaging Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the IMU, and persuading them to renounce the 
use of violence/reaffirm their commitment to non-violence, as part of an effort to 
establish a new ‘civic agreement’ on social order in Uzbekistan 
5. promoting relationships and structures in the Central Asian region that facilitate 
the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes 
 
The two packages differ in the manner in which they approach these aims.  Package one is a 
limited form of engagement, that seeks primarily to change attitudes and policies in the short-
term, concentrating on factors that contain the potential for sparking off immediate violence.  
Package two envisages a broader engagement, that includes all the measures proposed in 
package one, but complements them with a wider approach that also aims to address the 
structural causes and institutions that underpin the conflict. 
 
Table 6 and Annex 1 outline a basic framework for each of these packages.  The key areas 
of engagement for CP1 are outlined in the first column, whilst the additional measures to be 
undertaken as part of CP2 are enumerated in the second column.  It is important to 
understand both these packages as a cohesive strategy and not simply a series of projects.  
They would have to be based on an ongoing assessment of the areas most open to change 
in the short-term and of the current constellation of available resources and opportunities for 
effective engagement.  The principle resources currently available to the international 
community are:  embassies and missions in Tashkent; the OSCE mission to Uzbekistan; UN 
agencies active in Uzbekistan and particularly the UN Resident Co-ordinator and UNDP; the 
World Bank, IMF, ADB, and EBRD presence and programmes in Uzbekistan; international 
NGOs and domestic civil society 
 
Table 6 summarises the first full year 1 of engagement (i.e. 2004) in which both packages 
aim to achieve concrete outcomes (for example, the cessation of egregious abuses of power 
by the state and its security forces), whilst CP2 also includes longer-term strategic goals.  
This includes enhancing the capacity of the international community to analyse and 
understand conflict in the region and respond appropriately, positioning international actors 
widely enough and in key positions in society, to facilitate effective engagement in conflict 
prevention in the long-term.  Full details of these illustrative packages are given in Annex 1.  
In subsequent years, modifications to this basic package will be required as the situation in 
Uzbekistan changes.  The timelines in Annexes 2 and 3 suggest appropriate modifications 
(and cost implications) for both Packages for years 2-15.  A central proposition of this case 
study is the need for CP strategies to be flexible in response to developing circumstances.  
The detailed measures laid out in Annexes 2 and 3, as well as Annex 1, illustrate how this 
might be done. 
Table 6: Costs of Conflict Prevention Package in 2004 ($m  2004 prices) 
 
CP Package 1: 
proximate 
causes 
CP Package 2: 
structural 
causes 
Total CP 
Package 2 
Accountable government 2.3m 3.2m 5.5m 
Accountable security 
forces 1.5m 2.6m 
4.1m 
Ferghana Valley 4.3m 2.7m 7.0m 
Radical Islamic groups 4.6m 5.2m 9.8m 
Regional cooperation  1.1m 0.5m 1.6m 
Total  13.9m 14.2m 28.1m 
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 Neither package includes the costs of large scale military deployments for peacekeeping or 
monitoring (more than 250 personnel at any time) nor do they include costs for additional 
large scale development assistance programmes.  Uzbekistan currently receives ODA of 
around $200 million net per year and it is assumed that (other than the measures listed in 
Annex 1) this volume will not change significantly. 
 
Conflict Prevention Package 1 
 
This package (CP1) is premised on the principle that CP measures must be targeted at 
specific leaders or key groups with a view to changing their attitudes to use of force.  
 
The cost estimates are based on current levels of funding for conflict prevention measures in 
a number of countries of the former Soviet Union, especially Georgia, where the UK is a 
principal funder and where the international community has in place a comprehensive suite 
of measures.  For around $6 million (₤4 million), the UK is now funding a suite of conflict 
prevention measures with key elements similar to those in the proposed CP1 for Uzbekistan, 
either independently or in collaboration with other donors and international organisations.  
About ₤2.2 million is directed through assessed contributions to UNOMIG and OSCE, with 
most going to UNOMIG and around ₤1 million provided as discretionary funding.  Both 
UNOMIG and OSCE maintain well-staffed offices in Georgia and these along with other 
international agencies, such as UNHCR and UNDP, provide a rich resource for regular 
analysis and assessment in support of conflict prevention initiatives.  
 
Conflict Prevention Package 2 
 
CP2 is premised on the view that a limited package such as CP1 may temporarily ameliorate 
the conflict situation, but that institutional reform and the possibility of institutional reform will 
be key to helping change conflict dynamics.  Since CP2 engages with the structural 
underpinnings of the conflict, it directly addresses the underlying causes of conflict.  
Assuming that international actors manage to create the space for initial engagement and 
‘open the door’, the package will influence future developments and gradually open new 
arenas for engagement, as reflected in the second timeline. 
 
Comparison of Conflict Prevention Packages 
 
Table 7 below compares the costs of the two CP packages over time.  The 2004 cost is 
explained in Table 6 and Annex 1.  The changes in cost in subsequent years result from the 
changes in engagement outlined in Annexes 2 and 3. 
 
The annual costs for CP1 are based on a restructuring of engagement in response to a 
deterioration in the conflict situation, although the annual cost remains relatively constant, as 
some areas of intervention that are no longer appropriate are dropped as new ones are 
taken up.  CP2 anticipates a gradually expanding engagement in response to new 
opportunities that arise as the chances of conflict recede.  Although this costs more in the 
long-term the value of the package is greater, as it engages in more structural reform, having 
a much greater effect on the probability of conflict.  
 
During this period it is important to generate changes that would be felt in a direct manner by 
the population.  Stopping egregious abuses of power and widespread human rights abuses 
would significantly reduce the potential for conflict, whilst the provision of at least some 
opportunities for political participation and sustaining livelihoods would give many people 
confidence that there is a reasonable future ahead.  In both CP packages it is these 
immediately-felt impacts of the packages that prevent the probability of conflict rising before 
2006. 
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 It is after 2006 that the limitations of CP1 in comparison to CP2 become more evident.  By 
focusing on direct measures and the factors likely to trigger violence, CP1 is able to maintain 
the probability of conflict at a lower level than would otherwise be the case, but is unable to 
stem the move towards the structural underpinnings of conflict worsening.  CP2, on the other 
hand, by engaging with the structural factors as well, manages to keep the probability of 
conflict low until 2010.  After this, if change becomes more institutionalised and non-state 
actors have become more convinced of the long-term durability of the changes that have 
been implemented, then the annual probability starts to fall and continues to do so as new 
changes in society and power structures continue to occur. 
 
Table 7: Costs of Conflict Prevention Packages ($m 2004 prices) 
 
Year Cost of CP package 1 Cost of CP package 2 
2004 13.9 28.75 
2005 14.1 30.65 
2006 14.6 30.65 
2007 15.1 50.65 
2008 15.1 50.75 
2009 15.5 55.75 
2010 16.0 59.75 
2011 17.3 59.75 
2012 17.3 59.75 
2013 17.3 59.75 
2014 17.3 49.75 
2015 17.3 44.75 
2016 17.3 39.75 
2017 17.3 34.75 
2018 17.3 29.75 
Total 242.7 684.95 
 
 
3.7 PROBABILITY OF CONFLICT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION PACKAGES 
 
Without a conflict prevention package, the probability of large-scale armed conflict breaking out 
in Uzbekistan during the next 15 years is estimated to be around 70 per cent.  Whilst the 
probability within the next five years remains relatively low, tensions are set to continue to build 
over this period, with a fair chance (about 25 to 50 per cent) that they will precipitate at least one 
major violent incident by 2009.  
 
The changes in probabilities for violence brought on by the conflict prevention packages do 
not depend on elimination of all causes of conflict or the turning away from violence of all key 
players, but the delivery of a CP package can reduce the probability to a much lower level.  
This presumption is based on close monitoring of changes in political attitudes and 
adjustment in policy and diplomacy as a result. 
 
It is estimated that CP1 would reduce the probability of the conflict scenario to 25 per cent 
over the 15 year period.  This means in effect that one or two key leaders remain highly likely 
to resort to force and that they could mobilise a large number of supporters to violence 
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 because a number of key underlying causes of conflict at the institutional level have not been 
addressed. 
 
It is estimated that the delivery of CP2 would reduce the probability of the conflict scenario to 
around 10 per cent.  This means in effect that one or two key leaders remain highly likely to 
resort to force, but are unlikely to be able to mobilise many supporters to violence because 
most underlying causes of conflict at the institutional level have been addressed.  There 
would then need to be a serious crisis of some sort to bring on widespread mobilisation of 
people to fight. 
 
 
3.8 NET PRESENT VALUE AND ASSESSMENT 
 
The paper estimates that, in order to be cost-effective to the international community, the two 
proposed CP Packages would have to reduce the probability of large-scale conflict by 10% 
and 28% respectively.  If the potential savings to Uzbekistan and its neighbours are also 
taken into account, the breakeven probabilities are much lower at 0.6% and 1.6% 
respectively.  
 
These ‘breakeven’ probabilities reflect the relatively low costs of both CP Packages, which 
cost $191m and $542m (NPV at 2004 prices) respectively over the 15 year period.  The 
packages are only equivalent to around one sixth of current net ODA flows to Uzbekistan, 
currently $160m a year, which it is assumed will continue.41  In our judgement, this is enough 
to provide effective CP packages that are well targeted, politically driven and regularly re-
assessed and reshaped.  
 
The study may underestimate the costs of the conflict to the international community in 
several respects.  First, because it assumes that the conflict does not begin to escalate until 
around 2010, the international community intervention (with humanitarian assistance and 
possibly a small peacekeeping force) only takes place in 2012-2013, towards the end of the 
15-year timeframe of our methodology.  Any costs that are incurred after 2018 are not 
included in the calculation.  Second, the size of the UN peacekeeping force deployed from 
2013 is assumed to be relatively small, around 1000 personnel and it is assumed that there 
is only a 50% chance that such a force will be deployed.  If the strategic importance of 
Uzbekistan grows over the next decade, however, the international community may feel a 
much larger commitment is justified: increasing the costs of failing to prevent conflict now.  
Third, the study makes no allowance for the impact of the conflict on the incidence of 
international terrorism or the global availability of narcotics (including transit trade from 
Afghanistan).  If one were to assume that a strengthening of Islamist armed groups in 
Uzbekistan, together with a growth in lawlessness in the Ferghana Valley, had a negative 
effect on the international community in these two areas, then the estimates given here for 
benefits of CP to the international community will have been substantially underestimated.  
 
Both Packages illustrate the merits, in terms of cost-effectiveness, of engaging in CP 
programmes well before the onset of a potential conflict.  Even if no additional CP is 
undertaken, the study estimates that large-scale conflict is unlikely before 2009 or 2010.  The 
main impact of making a relatively small but sustained commitment to CP, therefore, is to 
reduce the chances of conflict in Uzbekistan after 2010.  
 
To hedge against the small, but significant, risk of war occurring before 2010, the IC  could 
implement more of Package 2 in the early years, bringing forward the $20m increase in poverty 
reduction programmes from 2007 to 2005, and bringing forward the $5m increase in institutional 
support from 2008 to 2005. This would increase the total cost of Package 2 by $50 mn (NPV, 
                                                 
41  2001 figure at 2004 prices. WB, World Development Report 2004, 2004, p. 260. 
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 2004 prices) and would raise the breakeven probability for the IC to 31% and the breakeven 
(including Uzbekistan and its neighbours) to 1.9%.  
 
One obstacle to the implementation of parts of the packages proposed here could be the 
willingness of the government of Uzbekistan to allow their implementation.  External support 
of any kind to opposition groups, human rights groups or independent media might be the 
first elements of the packages to meet such resistance.  Similarly, the government is unlikely 
to view favourably the opening of OSCE field offices in the Ferghana Valley.  Both packages 
are designed as influencing strategies and the international community would need to 
implement those parts of the packages that it could.  However at the core of both packages 
lies a suite of diplomatic pressures and dialogue, backed up by tough conditionality and 
sensitive implementation.  These are to some extent invulnerable to sustained resistance by 
the Government of Uzbekistan.  As long as it remains relatively dependent on international 
support (including ODA), it will not be able to oppose implementation of most elements of the 
package.  Obviously, the fewer entry points the international community has (or is prepared 
to use), the less likely any CP measures are to work. 
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Annex 1: Indicative Conflict Prevention Packages for Interested External Acto
Conflict Prevention Package 1: addresses proximate 
causes (to change actors’ attitudes/polices) -  short-term 
Cost 
(US$2004)
Conflict Prevention Package 2:also
causes (to change institution
Aim 1: to promote accountable government, political participation, and the protection of human rights 
E. Intense diplomatic dialogue with key leaders (top five) of 
the GoU to reverse or avoid egregious abuses of power 
F. Monitor impact of this diplomacy and report publicly 
G. Establish Contact Group/Donor Assistance Group 
(including at least Russia, US, EU) to provide incentives 
behind this pressure 
H. Link further financial assistance to progress (and review 
negative signals from military assistance programmes43) 
as normal part of donor group work 
I. Work with opposition groups and external actors to report 
on and oppose egregious abuses (=sending the 
necessary signal that egregious abuse of power is not 
acceptable)  
J. Enhanced OSCE office (with new staff) acting as 
focal/coordination point for this engagement 
K. Promote think-tanks (government-linked or independent) 
within Uzbekistan to work on these specific short-term 
issues 
L. Mobilise support for a more open, fair and contested 2004  
parliamentary election  
M. Support OSCE in promotion of this goal and monitoring of 
processes  
N. Mobilise media and civil society, in Uzbekistan and 
outside, behind these goals 
 
Total
100,000
50,000
300,000
-
500,000
180,000
40,000
100,000
80,000
1,000,000
2.3m
d. EU, US and Russia to agree commo
structural changes required44 
e. Use Agreement on Strategic Partner
and Partnership and Cooperation Ag
these issues and draw up timetable f
f. Technical assistance to support the s
the executive, judiciary and legislativ
the Constitution 
g. Work with others to draft and lobby f
the protection of religion 
h. Support a new law on the freedom o
i. Provide financial and technical assis
media outlets 
j. Support reform of electoral law and l
k. Fund Uzbekistani media NGO(s) 
l. Technical and financial support to op
(Birlik and Erk) 
m. Technical and financial support to pa
n. Insist on the right of NGOs to registe
harassment 
o. Provide long-term technical and fina
to NGOs and civil society organisatio
p. Fund an independent legal centre th
opposition politicians, journalists, NG
Aim 2: to develop accountable security forces and an end to impunity for human rights abuses and torture 
G. Intense private and public diplomatic dialogue with key 
leaders (top five) of the GoU  
H. Technical support for full and immediate implementation 
of recommendations of Special Rapporteur on Torture 
I. Encourage use of amnesty announced on 6 Dec 2002 to 
release prisoners 
J. Engage police leadership in intense dialogue on role and 
responsibilities of security forces 
K. Place western trainers in key influencing positions in 
security forces 
L. Increase financing for international and local HRs NGOs 
M. Position international civilian accompaniers with local HRs 
NGOs for protection 
N. Insist on right of ICRC to unimpeded access to 
prisons/detention centres 
 
 
 
100,000
200,000
100,000
100,000
400,000
400,000
200,000
-
a. Include SSR in development plans, i
Poverty Reduction Strategies 
b. Fund research and seminars on polic
and security, focused both on short-t
change 
c. Encourage a public debate on the ro
police 
d. Work on developing a police law, inc
UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforce
e. Fund independent complaints comm
of civil society 
f. Fund independent legal aid service, 
United Nations Basic Principles on th
g. Fund Ombudsman’s Office so it has 
human resources to carry out its func
h. Press for moratorium on death pena
punishment 
i. Provide 3 senior advisors to work wit
                                                 
42  This column addresses specific changes to the institutional regimes & social and economic structures. Where financial and 
technical support for measures addressing the structural causes is specified, this should generally be for a minimum three-
year period (preferably five years) if the support is to have any real value 
43  U.S. government, in keeping with the terms of the Cooperative Threat program and the Leahy Amendment to the Foreign 
Operations Assistance Act, should withhold security assistance until Uzbekistan’s human rights record, including 
performance of the security services, improves significantly 
44  These should focus on working towards establishing the rule of law, separation of powers, a pluralistic political system, a 
free press, and a vibrant civil society 
45  These include the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan and the Independent Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 1.5m
leadership on restructuring of forces 
j. Press for amendments to domestic p
k. Press for establishment of independe
l. Provide long-term technical & financ
protection to local HRs NGOs and lo
access to detention centres 
m. Develop programme of assistance fr
but make conditional on reform 
 
Aim 3: prevent key groups from mobilising the population of the Ferghana Valley to violence, whilst also laying
participation in political and economic life  
D. Develop thorough analysis of specific areas and issues of 
contention in the Ferghana Valley 
E. Open OSCE field offices in Ferghana and Namangan 
F. Target development interventions at areas and groups 
vulnerable to violence (Namangan, young unemployed 
men) 
G. Use targeted Quick Impact Projects to provide income 
and promote livelihoods 
H. Support cross-border conflict prevention initiatives 
I. Expand the UNDP conflict prevention project beyond the 
four pilot communities in Batken Province (how up to 
date?) 
J. OSCE and local observers to monitor next local elections 
K. Make at-risk areas of Ferghana Valley (eg Namangan) 
priority areas for interventions in support of media and 
civil society (see aim 1) 
L. Provide access and training on international law and 
border disputes to officials of all countries in FV 
M.  
Total
200,000
400,000
100,000
2,000,000
400,000
600,000
200,000
200,000
200,000
4.3m
a. IFIs to engage GoU in comprehensiv
focusing on poverty reduction 
b. Engage local authorities in formulatio
for regional and local development a
c. Engage community & religious leade
local authorities as partners in plann
d. Include in projects elements designe
appropriate capacity of local authorit
people 
e. Use the promotion of SMEs to help d
 
f. Fund programmes to rehabilitate wa
include the establishment of local ma
local cross-border cooperation  
g. Promote a restructuring of the educa
teaching religion, regional/internation
h. Fund research into the financial cost
laws that are currently restricting loca
reform of these laws 
Aim 4: to engage IMU & Hizb-ut-Tahrir in dialogue and persuade them to renounce the use of violence/reaffirm 
A. Develop expertise in Central Asian Islam in embassies 
B. Remove IMU from US list of terrorist organisations 
C. Resist calls to ban Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Western countries. 
D. Visibly pressurise the GoU to open up political and 
economic systems in ways that improve people’s lives 
and allow freedom of religion. 
E. Combine private pressure for reform with unambiguous 
public statements that distance Western governments and 
institutions from the repressive policies of Central Asian 
regimes 
F. Initiate contacts with leadership of IMU and H-u-T 
G. Facilitate behind-scenes dialogue with GoU 
H. Help negotiate amnesty/possibility of registration as 
political party 
I. Fund Quick Impact Projects in FV to provide alternative 
incomes to young men 
J. Integrate religious and other leaders into aid and 
assistance programmes 
K. Expand exchange programmes within CA and with West, 
including focus on religion 
L. Provide funds and support for publishing ventures for 
religious scholars, and scholars of religion. 
Total
1 ,000,000
-
-
100,000
100,000
200,000
100,000
100,000
500,000
500,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
4.6m
a. Develop regional Small Arms and Lig
b. Work with others to draft and lobby f
the protection of religion 
c. Support reform of electoral law and l
allow religiously-based parties to reg
d. Provide technical assistance on educ
for religious establishments, and in d
history of religion and comparative re
e. Encourage GoU to pursue a fair prog
accreditation, preferably under minis
appropriate balance of religious and 
f. Provide support for a network of relig
in Central Asia to teach about world 
religion, and develop materials in loc
g. Long-term support and financing for 
above) and human rights organisatio
h. Fund libraries, resource centres 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 Aim 5: promote relationships and structures in the Central Asian region that facilitate the peaceful settlement o
A. OSCE to offer services as mediator in serious border 
disputes 
B. Civilian border monitoring missions to be established 
where serious threat of conflict arising from border 
disputes 
C. Pressurise the GoU to cease mining borders and to sign 
up to the International Mine Ban Treaty 
D. Provide technical assistance to de-mining programmes 
E. Provide joint-training to border officials of all three FV 
countries 
F. Offer to mediate in inter-state disputes on the supply 
of/access to natural resource 
G. Fund local cross-border conflict prevention initiatives, 
and development and peacebuilding projects that span 
borders 
H. Fund water users associations 
Total
-
100,000
100,000
200,000
500,000
50,000
100,000
20,000
1.1m
a. Provide technical support to the work
commissions 
b. Provide technical and financial suppo
functioning of the Interstate Coordina
c. Provide technical and financial suppo
functioning of the Basin Water-Mana
Amu-Darya and Syr Darya 
d. Support the development of the Sha
Organisation as a mechanism for reg
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total cost of Conflict Prevention Package 1 (CP1) for year 1: US $13.9m 
 
Total cost of Conflict Prevention Package 2 (CP2) for year 1: US $28.1m 
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Annex 2: Modifications to Conflict Prevention Package 1 (year 1) in response to key 
developments during the period 2004-2019 
 
Events   Response Cost 46 (US$) 
Unfair parliamentary elections 
Protests in major cities 
Arrests follow 
2004  Strong representations to 
GoU 
Observers at protests 
Finance extra staff person at 
INGO to monitor arrests and 
follow up 
+200,000
IMU launches series of attacks from 
bases in FV, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan 
Security forces increase 
presence/activities  in FV 
2006  Facilitate inter-govt contacts 
Establish/increase OSCE 
border observation mission 
Deploy civilian monitors in FV 
+500,000
Unfair Presidential elections 
Severe harassment of opposition 
parties and leadership imprisoned 
Large protests in Tashkent and 
cities of FV 
2007  Expressions of severe 
concern   
Cancel any remaining military 
assistance 
Deployment of international 
monitors/observers at 
protests 
+500,000
IMU terrorist attacks continue  
 
 
 
Attacks on security forces in FV by 
local young men 
Crack-down by security forces.  
Arrests. 
Some homes raided and destroyed 
2009  Publicly condemn attacks and 
GoU response 
Deploy special envoy 
Facilitate dialogue between 
FV states on response 
 
 
International civilian 
observers monitor situation 
+200,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+200 000
Closure of borders in FV 
Exchange of small arms fire with K 
and T border forces 
2010  Deploy OSCE border 
monitors 
Confidence-building 
measures 
+500,000
GoU declares state of emergency in 
FV.  Mass arrests.  Start of guerrilla 
warfare 
 
 
GoU bombs IMU bases in K and T 
Food shortages in FV 
2011  Express concern 
Start detailed planning for 
humanitarian intervention in 
CPE 
Intense regional diplomacy 
Try to negotiate ceasefire to 
allow humanitarian access 
Try to initiate dialogue 
between GoU and IMU 
+300,000 
 
 
 
+1,000,000
Widespread fighting and human 
rights abuses 
Massive internal displacements of 
civilian population.  Some cross as 
refugees into neighbouring 
countries. 
2012  Consider arms embargo 
 
International humanitarian 
relief effort. 
 
 
Food shortages in Tashkent. 
Protests turn into rioting. 
 Extend humanitarian effort 
Plan for possible 
peacekeeping intervention 
 
                                                 
46  As well as possible additional expenditure, this framework also assumes the restructuring of current engagement in 
response to new developments; ie. some programmes may be wound down, whilst spending is increased elsewhere 
 Annex 3: Modifications to Conflict Prevention Package 2 (year 1) in response to key 
developments during the period 2004-2019 
 
Events  Response Cost47 (US$) 
Basic political reforms 
implemented   
 
 
Political parties and NGOs 
allowed to register and operate 
freely 
 
Relatively free parliamentary 
elections 
2004 Acknowledge achievement and 
press for further reform 
 
Commit to long-term support of key 
NGOs and CSOs, independent 
media 
 
Technical support and capacity 
building for parliament and 
parliamentarians 
+50,000 
 
 
+200,000 
 
 
+400,000
  
Muftiate given greater 
independence 
 
 
Use of torture significantly 
reduced; recommendations of 
Rapporteur being implemented 
 
 
Restrictions lifted on private trade 
and enterprise 
2005 Engage with muftiate in promoting 
religious education and tolerance 
 
Acknowledge progress.  Seek to 
engage in reform of penal system.  
Initiate an expanded programme of 
SSR 
 
Extend support to SME, promoting 
local trade 
 
+400,000 
 
 
+500,000 
 
 
 
 
+1,000,000
   
Freely contested presidential 
election. 
2007 Release more ODA for programmes 
focusing on poverty reduction, 
health, and education 
 
Expand engagement of IFIs and 
others in economic assistance 
 
+20,000,000
  
Significant reforms implemented 
aimed at establishing rule of law, 
and separation of powers 
2008 Encourage greater FDI in 
Uzbekistan 
 
Intense technical and financial 
support to new institutions to ensure 
their success 
+100,000 
 
+5,000,000
  
Freely contested parliamentary 
elections. 
2009  
  
Border demarcation commissions 
finish work 
2010 Expand programme of joint training 
for border officials 
 
Invest extra resources in promoting 
mechanisms for regional cooperation 
+2,000,000 
 
 
+2,000,000
  
Second round of parliamentary 
and presidential elections freely 
contested 
2014 Start to scale down financial 
involvement 
-10m per year
 
 
 
                                                 
47  As well as possible additional expenditure, this framework also assumes the restructuring of current engagement in 
response to new developments; i.e. some initiatives may be laid down, whilst spending is increased elsewhere. 
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